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THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: 1910-1921
DAVID P. CURRIE*

The unprecedented promotion' of Associate Justice Edward
Douglass White to succeed Melville Fuller as Chief Justice in 1910
marked a significant divide in the membership of the Supreme Court.
Within a single presidential term (1909-1912), William Howard Taft appointed five new Justices: Horace H. Lurton, Charles Evans Hughes,
Willis Van Devanter, Joseph R. Lamar, and Mahlon Pitney. Once
Pitney had succeeded John M. Harlan in 1912, the only additional
changes during White's eleven years as Chief Justice came when Woodrow Wilson replaced Lurton, Lamar, and Hughes with James C. McReynolds, Louis D. Brandeis, and John H. Clarke about midway
through the period. Like White, Joseph McKenna, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, and William R. Day were long-sitting holdovers who served
with the Chief Justice until his death in 1921.2
* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
My thanks to the Jerome S. Weiss Faculty Research Fund for financial support, to Katherine
Goodman for valuable research assistance, to Mary Beth Gose for housebreaking the computer, and
to Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, Cass Sunstein, Geoffrey Stone, and William Van Alstyne for
helpful comments.
1. Justice Cushing was nominated and confirmed as Chief Justice in 1796, but he declined the
promotion. See I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 139-40 (rev. ed.
1928).
2.
Justices of the Supreme Court during the Chief Justiceship of
Edward D. White: 1910-1921
1910 1912 1914 1916 1918 1920
John M. Harlan
(1877-1911)
-1
Edward D. White
(1894-1921)
Joseph McKenna
(1898-1925)
Oliver W. Holmes
(1902-1932)
William R. Day
(1903-1922)
Horace H. Lurton
(1909-1914)
Charles E. Hughes
(1910-1916)
I
Willis Van Devanter
(1910-1937)
I
Joseph R. Lamar
Mahlon Pitney

(1910-1916)
(1912-1922)

James C. McReynolds
Louis D. Brandeis
John H. Clarke
Adapted from G. GUNTHER, CASES
(10th ed. 1980).

(1914-1941)
(1916-1939)
(1916-1922)

[

AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

1717 app. A

1111

HeinOnline -- 1985 Duke L.J. 1111 1985

1112

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1985:1111

In terms of membership, therefore, the Court over which White presided had an identity rather distinct from that of its predecessor. In
terms of constitutional development, however, the White period was
largely a time of continuity. With the striking exception of Hammer v.
Dagenhart,3 the Court continued its general tendency toward broad construction of congressional powers, from the commerce clause in the
Shreveport Rate Case4 and the tax power in United States v. Doremus5 to
the war powers in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co.6
and the treaty power in Missouri v. Holland.7 Due process and equal
protection continued to be employed erratically to invalidate occasional
economic measures such as the state ban on yellow-dog contracts in Coppage v. Kansas,8 while the Court receded from its blockade of maximumhour legislation in Bunting v. Oregon.9 The Court did pay increasing
attention to the Civil War amendments in the field of racial justice, striking down a peonage law in Bailey v. Alabama,10 a grandfather clause for
voting in Guinn v. United States, " and a residential segregation ordinance in Buchanan v. Warley. 12 A series of decisions beginning with
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen 13 overshadowed the usual run of cases on
the negative effect of the commerce clause by proclaiming a preemptive
force in article III's grant of admiralty jurisdiction far stronger than that
ever attributed to the commerce clause itself. The most interesting and
important aspect of the White years, however, was the famous series of
wartime freedom of expression cases beginning with Justice Holmes's
opinion for the Court in Schenck v. United States, 14 and concluding with
the emergence of a more protective philosophy in his dissent in Abrams v.
United States 15 later the same year.
Like earlier installments in this series,16 the present article explores
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
249 U.S. 86 (1919).
251 U.S. 146 (1919).
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
236 U.S. 1 (1915).
243 U.S. 426 (1917).
219 U.S. 219 (1911).
238 U.S. 347 (1915).

12. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
13. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
14. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
15. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

16. D.

CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS

(1985); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 18891910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 324 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Fuller I]; Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: FullFaith and the Bill ofRights, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Fuller II].
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these and other decisions of the period from a lawyer's critical perspective in an investigation of methods of constitutional decisionmaking and
the quality of judicial craft. 17
I.

A.

ENUMERATED POWERS

The Courts.

As early as 1792, in Hayburn's Case, several Justices had concluded
on circuit that article III forbade federal courts to exercise nonjudicial
functions,' 8 and the whole Court had seemed to confirm this conclusion
the following year in the famous letter declining to give advisory opinions. 19 One of the first problems confronting the Court after White's
appointment as Chief Justice was the application of this principle.

In 1902 Congress had provided for allotting to individual members
of the Cherokee Nation lands previously belonging to the tribe itself.
When later statutes diminished the value of these individual allotments,
Congress authorized suits by named beneficiaries of the original provision against the United States "to determine the validity of" the impairing statutes. 20 Citing Hayburn's Case, the Correspondence,21 and two
later decisions, the Court in Muskrat v. United States held that the statute giving it appellate jurisdiction over these suits was invalid for want of
'22
a judicial "Case" or "Controversy.
17. The indispensable overall Court history of these years is 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1984). Standard older histories such as 2 C. WARREN, supra note 1, at 690-756, and A. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 760-94 (1935), barely mention the
White period. Biographies of the Justices include F. BIDDLE, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES (1942); M.
HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS, 1841-1870 (1957); M. HOWE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS, 1870-1882 (1963); M. KLINKHAMER,
EDWARD DOUGLAS [sic] WHITE, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (1943); A. MASON,
BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946); M. McDEvrIT, JOSEPH MCKENNA, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES (1946); J. MCLEAN, WILLIAM RUFUS DAY (1946); M. PUSEY, CHARLES
EVANS HUGHES (1951); H. WARNER, THE LIFE OF MR. JUSTICE CLARKE (1959).
18. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410-14 n.(a) (1792).
19. Correspondence of the Justices, reprinted in H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 64-66 (2d ed. 1973); see D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 11-12.
20. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 348-51 (1911). Three separate provisions were
challenged: the enlargement of the class of allottees, the lengthening of a time period within which
the original allottees were forbidden to alienate their land, and a grant of authority to the federal
government to convey pipeline rights of way over the land. Id. at 348-49. For further explanation of
the legislative background of Muskrat, see Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640, 642-46 (1912).
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. Muskrat,219 U.S. at 352-61 ( citing United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852),

discussedin D.

CURRIE,

supra note 16, at 262 n. 197; and Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.)

561 (1865), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 356 n.36). Finding Supreme Court review an
essential part of the statutory scheme, the Court ruled the review provision inseparable and thus held
that the Court of Claims could not exercise original jurisdiction either. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 363.
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The opinion, by Justice Day, begins with what appears to be a
sweeping denunciation of Congress's purpose as expressed in the jurisdictional statute: "[T]he object and purpose of the suit is wholly comprised
in the determination of the constitutional validity of certain acts of Congress; . . . there is neither more nor less in this procedure than an attempt to provide for a judicial determination . . . of the constitutional
validity of an act of Congress."'23 If the other requisites of justiciability
are met, however, it is difficult to see why a congressional desire for a
determination of constitutionality would make the suit any the less a
"Case." It would hardly invalidate the general provision for jurisdiction
over cases arising under the Constitution, for example, if it were shown
that Congress's purpose in enacting it had been to enable the Court to act
as a check upon other branches of government.
Indeed the opinion does not rest with its aspersions on legislative
motive. The reason why the present effort to obtain a declaration of constitutionality did not present a "Case" or "Controversy," Justice Day
continued, was that the United States, though made a defendant by the
statute, "has no interest adverse to the claimants."'24 Thus the Court
invoked the now standard learning, suggested perhaps by its division
over the Attorney General's right to litigate ex officio in Hayburn's Case,
that a "Case" or "Controversy" requires adverse parties with stakes in
the outcome-in order, among other things, to help assure that both
25
sides of the argument are adequately presented.
Just why the government had no adverse interest in Muskrat, however, the Court did not say. Nor was it obvious. In the first place, the
United States in Muskrat arguably had the same type of parens patriae
concern that traditionally gives the government a stake in the outcome of
criminal prosecutions, and which has led later Congresses to authorize
the government to sue for damages on behalf of workers under the Fair
Thus, the Court did not have to decide whether the special status of the Court of Claims excepted it

from the rule that article III courts could exercise only judicial functions. See also Richardson v.
McChesney, 218 U.S. 487, 492 (1910) (Lurton, J.) (refusing to decide a reapportionment claim
mooted by an election because "[t]he duty of the court is limited to the decision of actual pending

controversies").
23. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 360-61.
24. Id. at 361.
25. See Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at
6-9. For the modem view and its policy justification, see, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99
(1975) ("As an aspect ofjusticiability, the standing question is whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction.
...) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)); United States v. Fruehauf,
365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961) (refusing to give "legal judgment upon issues which remain unfocused
because they are not pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question
emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument").
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Labor Standards Act and to intervene as a party whenever the constitutionality of an act of Congress is challenged. 26 More pointedly, the statutes under attack contemplated various actions by federal officials
affecting the interests of the plaintiffs. Indeed, the very next year, and
without even discussing justiciability, the Court unanimously entertained
a suit by some of the same plaintiffs to enjoin federal officers from carry27
ing out one of the same statutes, on the same constitutional grounds. It
is true that the petition in Muskrat, while reporting the relevant allegations of the pending injunction suit, had neglected to specify that the
same threat of official action made the United States an appropriate defendant in Muskrat itself.2 8 There is some evidence in the opinion that
the Court was seizing upon this failure of phrasing. 29 To have relied
wholly on that, however, would probably have been extremely picky even
in 1911.
That something more substantial may have underlain the conclusion

that the government was not adverse to the particular petitions ified in
Muskrat was suggested by the Court's insistence that "the only judgment
required is to settle the doubtful character of the legislation. . . . [T]he
judgment could not be executed, and amounts in fact to no more than an

expression of opinion upon the validity of the acts in question."'30 The
implication seems to be that the judicial power did not extend to a complaint seeking only a declaratory judgment-though that was the essence
26. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1982) (allowing Secretary of Labor to bring suit on behalf of employee
claiming violation of Fair Labor Standards Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (1982) (allowing intervention
by the United States whenever constitutionality of act of Congress is called into question and the
United States, its agencies, officers, or employees are not parties to the case). For counterexamples
involving the sovereign interest of a state government, see Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50,
77 (1868) (no Supreme Court jurisdiction of suit by state to enjoin execution of Reconstruction
Acts), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 302-04; Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 220
U.S. 277, 289 (1911) (Harlan, J.) (no original Supreme Court jurisdiction of suit by state to prevent
overcharges to citizens).
27. Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1912) (upholding the addition of new allottees on the
ground that the original promise of allotment had created no vested rights). The Secretary of the
Interior had ultimate authority to approve additions to the allotment rolls compiled by a federal
commission; federal officials were directed to distribute assets to the allottees; and one of the statutes
authorized the Secretary to grant rights of way, which he had proceeded to do. Act of July 1, 1902,
ch. 1375, §§ 11, 29, 37, 32 Stat. 716, 717, 720-21, 722. See also Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S.
413, 438-39 (1912) (Hughes, J.) (upholding authority of United States as guardian of Cherokee rights
to sue to enforce the extended restraint on alienation challenged in Muskrat).
28. Record at 9, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). For similar allegations in the
other case decided with Muskrat, see Record at 10, Brown v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
29. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 362 (finding it irrelevant that the petitioners had filed other suits
because statute giving jurisdiction "must depend upon its own terms").
30. Id. at 361-62. The Court added that such ajudgment would "not conclude private parties,
when actual litigation brings to the court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation."
Id. at 362. A judgment that binds nobody is the essence of an advisory opinion; but there seems no
reason to doubt the judgment authorized would have bound the government as well as the plaintiffs.
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of traditional suits to quiet title or remove a cloud from title, to which
31
Justice Day did not refer.
The statutory provision for payment of the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees
"out of the funds in the United States Treasury belonging to the benefi-

ciaries" of the initial allotment legislation, though prominently mentioned in the opinion, was not expressly relied on as a basis of the
decision. 32 If one party pays the other's expenses, the suspicion may be
strong that the suit is collusive-as the Court would emphasize in throw33
ing out a suit on that ground a generation later.
An absolute rule against paying even a losing opponent's costs, however, would go too far. When the government is the one that pays, collusion is not the only permissible inference. In criminal cases publicly
financed defense lawyers flourish like rabbits, and there is an increasing
tendency to extend the principle of government support to other contexts

as well. 34 No one seems to think provisions such as these make a suit

collusive. Similarly, the plaintiffs in Muskrat, who as original allottees
stood to gain something of value and who had demonstrated their appar-

ent good faith by presenting the same claims in another suit without
promise of fees, might well have been expected to argue vigorously in

support of their position. More important, fees were to be paid only if
the plaintiffs won. Far from indicating the absence of an adversary relationship between the parties, this now familiar extension of the tradi-

tional assessment of costs actually reinforces such a relationship by
31. See also id. at 361 (stressing that the complaint sought no "compensation" from the United
States). Chief Justice Taney had said in his 1864 opinion prepared for Gordon v. United States,
published posthumously at 117 U.S. 697 (1886), that the award of execution was a necessary ingredient of any judicial judgment. Gordon, 117 U.S. at 702. There is no evidence, however, that Taney
was speaking for the Court, which had decided the case without opinion some years before. Gordon
v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 353 n.10.
Nor was Taney's statement necessary to the result in Gordon, for the statute there in question had
given the Executive the power to redetermine matters decided by the Court of Claims. The legislature's attempt to vest such a power in the Executive had doomed the pension law in Hayburn seventy
years before. Taney's observations on the judicial power were quoted in Muskrat, but his dictum
regarding execution was not emphasized. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 354-55. See generally Borchard, The
Declaratory Judgment-A Needed ProceduralReform, 28 YALE L.J. 1, 105 (1918) (giving other
examples of purely declaratory remedies and tracing the declaratory judgment itself to both English
and Roman law); Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights,-The DeclaratoryJudgment,
16 MICH. L. REv. 69 (1917) (giving examples of purely declaratory remedies in England, and arguing that the contemporary American practice of restricting use of declaratory judgments creates
"serious hardship in this country").
32. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 351, 360.
33. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304-05 (1943); see also D. CURRIE,supra note 16,
at 32 (discussing this issue in connection with Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), in
which the Court may have been unaware of the problem).
34. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(4)(A) (1982) (attorneys' fees may be awarded to parties who
present views that contribute to fair determination in rulemaking proceeding, even if they lose).
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increasing the incentive for each party to prevail. Finally, since the fees
were to be paid not from the government's own funds but from those it
held in trust for the plaintiff's class, Muskrat was not a case of one
35
party's paying the expenses of the other at all.

The fact that the statute singled out named individuals as plaintiffs
does raise a red flag: the government's ability to pick its adversary gives it
a grand opportunity to choose a patsy. No doubt it is better to have a
broad prophylactic rule against that sort of thing than to engage in a
subjective and burdensome assessment of the performance of counsel in

the particular case-especially since collusion poses a threshold issue
that ought to be resolved before there is a record on which to base the
decision. This may indeed be the strongest point in favor of the Court's
conclusion, but it was not a part of the Court's stated reasoning.
We are thus left wondering whether there was any justifiable basis
for the conclusion that the dispute was nonjusticiable, and, if so, just
what it was. In hinting at such a number of less than wholly persuasive

bases for the decision, Justice Day left us a monument of confusion full
of uncertain implications for future litigation.3 6 Perhaps the only reliable

lesson to be drawn from this episode is that if Congress wants to provide
for a test case it should be careful not to invite the conclusion that it has
37
provided instead for an advisory opinion.
35. Perhaps that is why, despite suggestively calling attention to the fee provision, the opinion
did not explain the provision's bearing on the decision.
36. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 124: "Complete the following sentence:
'The Supreme Court held that no justiciable controversy was presented in the Muskrat case because
...
'" For vehement criticism of no fewer than seven decisional grounds perceived in Muskrat,
see 3 K. DAvIs, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 21.01, at 120-24 (1958).
37. Apart from the unassailable application of the principle of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890) (article III does not authorize a citizen to sue his own state), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra
note 16, at 100 n.61, to admiralty cases in Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1921) (Pitney,
J.), the most interesting developments in the judicial power during the White period concerned political questions. In refusing to determine whether a state might constitutionally legislate by initiative
or referendum, the Court in Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 143-51 (1912)
(Wvhite, C.J.), followed the pattern of the Fuller Court, see Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 578-81
(1900), in overgeneralizing from the narrow alternative holding of Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1, 38-47 (1849) (recognition of state government committed to political branches), discussed
in D. CURRIE, supranote 16, at 252-57, to the flat conclusion that all controversies over the meaning
of article IV's guarantee of a republican form of government were nonjusticiable. Accord Marshall v.
Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1913) (Day, J.) (refusing to decide whether article IV, section 4 guaranteed the right to vote on proposed new state constitution). Interestingly, the Court managed in
PacificStates, 223 U.S. at 139-41, to dismiss even allegations based on the equal protection clause on
the ground that they were essentially efforts to raise the guarantee clause claim under another label-a judicial technique repudiated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1962), over Justice
Frankfurter's emphatic dissent. See also Ohio ex rel Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569-70
(1916) (vhite, C.J.) (disposing similarly of contention that article I, section 4's explicit reference to
state "Legislature[s]" forbade state to determine congressional districts by referendum). Later decisions reaching the merits of challenges to procedures for the ratification of constitutional amend-
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B. Congress.
1. The Shreveport Rate Case.

As early as 1838, in upholding a

federal statute outlawing the theft of shipwrecked goods in United States
v. Coombs,38 the Supreme Court had held that, in order to protect interstate commerce from interference, Congress could regulate conduct that

was not itself commerce. 39 Although this thesis had received a setback in
the 1895 sugar-trust case of United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 40 by 1908
the Fuller Court had returned to the traditional position in upholding the
application of the Sherman Act to the Danbury hatters. 41 Under Chief

Justice White the Court consistently followed the logic of this position to
42
uphold a number of far-reaching exercises of congressional authority.

In 1911, in one of his first constitutional opinions, the recently appointed Justice Hughes wrote for a unanimous Court to sustain a statute

limiting the number of hours a railroad employee engaged in interstate
commerce could work even on local trains:
The length of hours of service has direct relation to the efficiency of the
human agencies upon which protection to life and property necessarily
depends ....
[Congress's] power cannot be defeated either by prolonging the period of service through other requirements of the carriers
or by the commingling
of duties relating to interstate and intrastate
43
operations.

Later the same year, in a brief unanimous opinion by the even more recently appointed Justice Van Devanter, the Court upheld the extension
ments, however, suggested that the White Court was prepared neither to apply this reasoning to
every attack on the constitutionality of referenda nor to extend the political question category to new
areas unrelated to the guarantee clause. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920) (Day, J.)
(holding state could not make ratification of amendment to United States Constitution dependent on
referendum in light of article V provision for ratification by "Legislatures"); Dillon v. Gloss, 256
U.S. 368, 375-76 (1921) (Van Devanter, J.) (upholding power of Congress, in light of perceived
constitutional policy requiring contemporaneous consensus, to require ratification of constitutional
amendment within seven years); see also Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919) (White,
C.J.) (assuming justiciability in reasoning that veto could be overridden under article 1, section 7 by
two thirds of members present and voting).
See also Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) (Van Devanter, J.) (reasoning cleanly, if somewhat
mechanically, that a general income tax reduced the compensation of federal judges in violation of
article III-a conclusion later abandoned, O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939), for the
expectable reason, given by Holmes and Brandeis in dissent in Evans, 253 U.S. at 265, that the
generality of the tax reduced its threat to the underlying policy of judicial independence, O'Malley,
307 U.S. at 281-83); Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918) (White, C.J.) (Court has authority to enforce judgment against state).
38. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838) (Story, J.).
39. Id. at 78-79, discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 234 & n.268.
40. 156 U.S. 1 (1895), discussed in Fuller I, supra note 16, at 346.
41. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
42. See generally 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 200-42, 414-76 (discussing the
decisions).
43. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612, 619 (1911).
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of the Safety Appliance Act to require appropriate couplers on cars traveling locally on interstate railroads, reasoning that interstate and local
cars were frequently parts of the same train, and that an accident to a
wholly local train could impede the passage of an interstate one. The
power over interstate commerce, the Court concluded, "may be exerted
to secure the safety of the persons and property transported therein and
of those who are employed in such transportation, no matter what may
be the source of the dangers which threaten it." 44 Similarly, early in
1912, Justice Van Devanter wrote again for a unanimous bench to sustain the application of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to an injury
sustained by an employee who was engaged in interstate commerce
although the employee who had caused the injury was not: "[S]uch negligence, when operating injuriously upon an employ6 engaged in interstate
commerce, has the same effect upon that commerce as if the negligent
employ6 were also engaged therein." 45
The culmination of this line of authority came in 1914, in the famous case of Houston, E. & W. Tex Ry.v. United States (the Shreveport
Rate Case).46 Finding that low intrastate rates set by the Texas Railroad
Commission diverted traffic that would otherwise have traveled between
Texas and Shreveport, Louisiana, the Interstate Commerce Commission
ordered the affected railroads to equalize their local and interstate rates.
Accepting the railroads' contention that compliance might require them
to raise local rates, the Court nevertheless upheld the Commission's order on the basis of the decisions just noted: "Congress is entitled to keep
the highways of interstate communication open to interstate traffic upon
fair and equal terms." 47
This conclusion followed with impeccable logic from prior decisions. Van Devanter had been stating settled law when he said in the
coupler case that Congress could protect interstate commerce no matter
what the source of the danger. That the danger in the cases before
44. Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911).
45. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 52 (1912); see 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT,

supra note 17, at 208 n.28 (suggesting that this decision cast doubt on the earlier conclusion, in First
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908), that Congress could not regulate liability of an
interstate carrier for injuries to workers not engaged in commerce, because even in the latter case
liability might affect interstate commerce). These decisions, together with others discussed in Fuller
I, supra note 16, at 363-69, call into question Professor Tribe's assertion that "willingness on the
part of the pre-1937. Supreme Court to see the interconnectedness of formally interstate and intrastate activities was unusual," L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 235 (1977).
46. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
47. Shreveport, 234 U.S. at 353-54. See also id. at 355 ("[I]n removing the injurious discrimination against interstate traffic arising from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates, Congress is not
bound to reduce the latter below what it may deem to be a proper standard fair to the carrier and to
the public.").
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Shreveport had been that of physical rather than economic obstruction
seemed irrelevant to the question of congressional power, and thus the
48
precedents seemed to fit like a glove.
What was perhaps most interesting about the opinion was the subtle
way in which Justice Hughes modified the standard learning even as he
49
applied it to what may have been the most extreme case yet decided.
Whereas Van Devanter had said the source of the threat was irrelevant,
as it surely was to the scope of the federal interest in protecting commerce, Hughes chose to focus on the fact that the carriers whose local

rates had been challenged were also engaged in interstate operations:
"Congress . . may . . .requir[e] that the agencies of interstate commerce shall not be used in such manner as to cripple, retard or destroy
it."5o
Possibly, like the careful jurist he was, Justice Hughes was only trying to avoid prejudging future controversies. In light of the unexplained
dissenting votes of Justices Lurton and Pitney, however, the conspicuous
repetition of the fact that the railroads before him were instrumentalities
of interstate commerce may suggest that Hughes was attempting to find
some way to limit the implications of his decision. As Chief Justice
Fuller had emphasized in essaying a different but equally unsatisfying
limitation in the sugar-trust case, the argument that Congress may protect commerce from any interference seemed likely to push the Court to
the position, in the teeth of the careful enumeration of limited powers
confirmed by the tenth amendment, that Congress could regulate just
48. For an effort to distinguish the coupler case, see Coleman, The Evolution ofFederalRegulation of IntrastateRates: The Shreveport Rate Cases, 28 HARV. L. REV. 34, 69-70 (1914). For a
defense of the rate decision, see Bikl, Federal Control of IntrastateRailroad Rates, 63 U. PA. L.
REV. 69 (1914). The argument that the common law against whose background the commerce
clause had been adopted forbade trespasses but not competition suggests that Congress could not
limit competition even in commerce itself and is hard to square with the purpose for which the
clause was adopted-to prevent otherwise lawful state taxes. Indeed, the result in Shreveport had
been foretold the preceding year in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 417, 432-33 (1913)
(Hughes, L) (refusing to strike down similar state rates in the absence of federal legislation).
In the same spirit as the decisions discussed in the text was United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S.
199 (1919) (White, C.L) (Congress may protect interstate commerce from false bills of lading).
49. See also Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) (White, C.J.) (upholding requirement that
railroad workers be paid ten hours' wages for eight hours' work to prevent strike interrupting commerce); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 72-74 (1913) (Day, J.)
(allowing Congress to provide for sale of power produced by navigation dam), discussed in 9 A.
BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 221 (describing the decision as "[t]he most ungrudging
legitimation of federal power" during the White years"); ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194,
214 (1912) (Day, J.)(perfunctorily upholding requirement that interstate carriers file reports covering even local operations), discussed in 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 214-15 (arguing that the case could have gone even further).
50. Shreveport, 234 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). Numerous other examples of such qualifying
language are found in id. at 351-55.
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about anything it liked-for there is scarcely anything in a mobile
society
51

that cannot be plausibly argued to affect interstate commerce.
If that was what troubled Justice Hughes, he deserves some credit
for a modest attempt to slow the juggernaut. The line he attempted to
draw, however, was an unconvincing one that had been rejected three
quarters of a century before when the Taney Court held that Congress
could provide for punishing a thief who was not an agency of
52
commerce.
2. Hammer v. Dagenhart. If Justice Hughes in the Shreveport
case was trying to limit the logical growth of the commerce power, he
managed to uphold a striking exercise of that power in the process. Just

the year before, moreover, in Hoke v. United States,53 the Court had followed the implications of yet another Fuller Court precedent in holding
that Congress could outlaw the interstate transportation of women for
immoral purposes. As in the Lottery Case,54 wrote Justice McKenna
without provoking a dissent, it was no objection to the validity of Congress's enactment that the purpose and effect of the statute were to promote morality rather than to prevent obstructions to commerce:
"Congress['s] . . .power over transportation 'among the several States'
. . .is complete in itself," and rules adopted under it "may have the
quality of police regulations. ' 55
51. See Jefferson's early demonstration of the need to find some limiting principle, quoted in G.
GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 95-96. For Fuller's efforts, see United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 13 (1895). Fuller's distinction between "direct" and "indirect" injuries to commerce might
plausibly have been employed to preclude federal regulation in Shreveport, because the immediate
effect of a low state rate was on those who shipped locally; the concomitant loss to interstate business
could fairly be described as secondary. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning fails to distinguish the
safety appliance case, in which Van Devanter had relied in part on the existence of a potential
secondary effect-obstructing interstate traffic--caused by an accident disabling a local train. Moreover, the direct/indirect distinction seems quite irrelevant to the inquiry at hand.
52. For decisions of the White years broadly construing Congress's power to ensure the enforceability of measures regulating interstate commerce itself, see McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S.
115, 136 (1913) (Day, J.) (upholding power to require that labels remain on goods after interstate
shipment to facilitate inspection for previous violation), and Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U.S. 45, 58 (1911) (McKenna, J.)(upholding power to seize adulterated food after illegal interstate
shipment). For further evidence of the contrasting fear of construing the commerce clause too
broadly, see the Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548 (1914) (Holmes, J.)(taking a surprisingly grudging
line in reaching the easy conclusion that economic regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act
could be extended to interstate oil pipelines), discussedin 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17,
at 232-38 (revealing the extent to which Holmes was forced to tone down the opinion).
53. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
54. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), discussed in Fuller I, supra note 16, at 354-55.
55. Hoke, 227 U.S. at 323. For invocation of the Lottery Case, see id. at 321. See also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1917) (Day, J.)(upholding the same statute as applied
to interstate transportation of a woman for personal rather than commercial purposes); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 325-32 (1917) (White, C.J.) (upholding act of Congress
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When, however, Congress predictably took advantage of this reasoning to discourage child labor by prohibiting interstate shipment of
goods made in factories employing children, a divided Court executed a
sharp about-face. The statute, said Justice Day in Hammer v.

Dagenhart,56 "in a twofold sense is repugnant to the Constitution. It not
only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over commerce but
also exerts a power as to a purely local matter to which the federal au57
thority does not extend."

By this peculiar reference to "twofold" unconstitutionality, Day
may only have meant to make the obvious point that a statute Congress
was not authorized to pass offended the tenth amendment as well.5 8 If he
meant that a measure lying within Congress's delegated authority might

nevertheless be invalid because the matter was "purely local," however,
the statement was revolutionary and quite insupportable. As more able
Justices than Day had said before and would say again, the tenth amend-

ment takes nothing from the federal government that other provisions
have given; it reserves to the states only those powers not granted to the
59
United States.
If Justice Day meant that the tenth amendment showed there must

be some significant powers that Congress could not exercise, 60 he was on
firmer ground. That Congress's powers are limited, however, does not

tell us where to draw the boundary. As an original matter, a respectable
prohibiting shipment of liquor into state for sale or use in violation of its laws); Weber v. Freed, 239
U.S. 325, 329-30 (1915) (White, C.J.) (upholding congressional authority to ban import of boxing
films); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1911) (McKenna, J.) (assuming the
unchallenged authority of Congress to exclude adulterated food from interstate commerce); 9 A.
BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 224-32 (finding in Hoke's reference to "immoral" purposes,
227 U.S. at 320, and Hipolite's reference to "illicit" articles, 220 U.S. at 57, ambiguities that might
significantly limit the sweep of their reasoning); 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 433
(castigating Caminetti's wooden approach to statutory construction, and adding that, although the
Court in Caminetti had conceded "that Congress could not simply regulate the conduct that a traveler in interstate commerce intended to engage in once he reached his destination," it "affirmed a
power to do precisely that in the case of a man and a woman voluntarily traveling together"); cf
infra note 167 (discussing another aspect of Clark Distilling).
56. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
57. Id. at 276.
58. The amendment was invoked, id. at 274, and erroneously paraphrased, id. at 275, as reserving to the states "the powers not expressly delegated to the National Government" (emphasis added).
59. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (Stone, J.); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 160-68.
60. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276: "[I]f
Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to local
authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in interstate commerce,. . . the power of
the States over local matters may be eliminated, and thus our system of government be practically
destroyed." Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (insisting that measures
adopted under necessary and proper clause be consistent with "spirit" as well as letter of the Constitution), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 164.
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argument could have been made that the commerce power should be
construed, in light of its purpose, only to authorize measures that removed obstructions to commerce. The difficulty was that this position
had been rejected both in the Lottery Case and in Hoke, neither of which
61
the Hammer Court purported to question.
Apart from an otherwise unexplained reference to "the character of
the particular subjects dealt with" in earlier cases, the only basis for distinction the Court offered was that in each of the prior cases "the use of
interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results," whereas in the child-labor case the harm was over before
interstate commerce began. 62 Conspicuously, Justice Day made no effort
to say why that mattered. Holmes, who said all the right things in his
dissent, thought the difference immaterial: "It is enough that in the opinion of Congress the transportation encourages the evil."' 63 It is hard to
64
believe that the majority found its own distinctions persuasive.
61. Justice Day protested that both the purpose and the effect of the law prohibiting commerce
in child-made goods were to prevent child labor in the factory itself, but both the lottery and whiteslave laws had survived similar objections. The suggestion that prohibition was not regulation,
Hammer, 247 U.S. at 269-70, had been rejected not only in the same two cases but also-in the
context of foreign commerce-many years before by one of the most state-minded Justices ever to sit
on the Court. See D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 234 n.270 (discussing United States v. Marigold, 50
U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850) (Daniel, J.)).
62. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 270-72. For elaboration of this distinction, see Cushman, The National Police Power and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. Rav. 289, 381-400
(1919) (the most comprehensive contemporaneous commentary). Professor Bickel took the reference to the "character of the particular subjects" as harking back to the insistence in Hoke and
Hipolite, see supra note 55, that those cases dealt with "immoral" behavior and "illicit" articles. See
9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 447; id. at 454-58 (adding that Hammer came as a
shock to the public and was poorly received by academics). The relevance of an external standard of
"immorality," if that was what the Court had in mind, was never made clear.
63. Hammer,247 U.S. at 279-80. For contemporaneous support of this position, see Bikl6, The
Commerce Power and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 21, 28-36 (1919); Brinton, The
Constitutionalityofa FederalChild LaborLaw, 62 U. PA. L. REv.487, 502-03 (1914); Gordon, The
Child Labor Law Case, 32 HARV. L. REV. 45, 51-54 (1918); Lewis, The FederalPower to Regulate
Child Laborin the Light ofSupreme CourtDecisions, 62 U. PA. L. REV.504, 506-08 (1914); Parkinson, Congressional Prohibitions of Interstate Commerce, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 367, 370-71 (1916);
Powell, Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution, 1 N.C.L. REv. 61, 62-68 (1922). Both Gordon
and Parkinson noted the inability of states to forbid interstate transportation of child-made goods,
and pointed out the anomaly of interpreting a clause dividing authority between state and nation so
as to extinguish authority altogether. See also T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONsTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 68 (1956) (describing the lot of the nation, under a holding denying to
both Congress and the states of destination the power to exclude products from other states that are
not impure, as "not wholly a happy one").
64. The shift cannot be explained in terms of intervening changes in personnel. Of the three
Justices appointed between Hoke and Hammer, Brandeis and Clarke joined Holmes and McKenna
(the author of Hoke) in the Hammer dissent. Day was joined in the majority not only by the newly
appointed and implacably conservative McReynolds but also by White, Van Devanter, and Pitney,
all of whom, like Day himself, had voted to uphold the white-slave law. Commentators suggested a
possible basis for distinction not noted by the Court: that Congress's power may be greater when it
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3. Doremus, Hamilton, and Holland. The feebleness of the majority's efforts in Hammer to get around the preexisting law, like Justice

Hughes's insistence that the Shreveport case involved an instrumentality
of interstate commerce, suggests an increasing uneasiness about the im-

plications of earlier decisions for the notion of a limited central government.

In the term after Hammer, White, Van Devanter, and

McReynolds displayed a similar concern by voting in United States v.
Doremus 65 to strike down a statute that patently attempted to regulate
66
narcotics sales under the cloak of the federal tax power.

The regulatory aspect of the law was unmistakable: the law required sales to be made on specified forms open to inspection, and it

forbade use of the forms except for legitimate purposes. "In other
words," wrote Professor Bickel, "no addicts could be served, whether or
not they paid the tax." Moreover, the tax itself was so small-one dollar
per year-as to raise serious doubts whether it served any legitimate revenue purpose. 6 7 If there were cases for invoking Marshall's admonition
that federal powers were not to be used as the "pretext" for invading
69
state authority, 68 Doremus seemed a strong candidate for inclusion.

Without even citing Hammer, however, the majority blithely upheld the
tax in an opinion looking for all the world like Holmes's dissent in that
case, relying on all the precedents establishing that the tax power was no
more defeated by a purpose or effect of intruding on local affairs than the
commerce clause had been before Hammer itself. This time the author
was not Holmes, but Day, who had so emphatically said the opposite as
to the commerce clause in Hammer only the year before, and he took
Pitney with him. 70
acts to reinforce rather than to contradict state policy. See Bruce, Interstate Commerce and Child
Labor, 3 MINN. L. REv. 89, 95-96 (1919); Cushman, supra note 62, at 400-12. This suggestion will
be discussed in the next installment in this series, Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
1921-1930, 1986 DUKE L.J. - (forthcoming), in connection with Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S.
432 (1925).
65. 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
66. Id. at 95 (dissenting opinion). For unexplained reasons, they were joined by Justice McKenna, who had written for the Court to uphold the white-slave law and had dissented from invalidation of the child-labor provision.
67. See 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 435.

68. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
69. Cf. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (holding that grandfather clause violates
fifteenth amendment), discussed infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
70. "We cannot agree with the contention that the provisions. . . controlling the disposition of
these drugs in the ways described, can have nothing to do with facilitating the collection of the
revenue .

. . ."

Doremus, 249 U.S. at 95. Professor Powell, T. POWELL, supra note 63, at 87,

termed this decision "[h]ardly candid." For an effort to distinguish earlier cases on the bizarre
ground that prohibition was a more legitimate use of the tax power than was regulation, see Long,
FederalPolicePowerRegulation by Taxation, 9 VA. L. REv. 81, 83-94 (1922). The best contemporaneous discussion of the general problem is Cushman, The National Police Power and the Taxing
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If these Justices were worried about residual state sovereignty, they
were highly selective about it. If the distinction was between the tax and
commerce powers, it seemed backwards: because the commerce power
can be used for ulterior ends only to the extent that interstate or foreign
intercourse is implicated, exercise of the tax power seems to pose the
greater danger. One hopes the explanation is not simply that Day and
71
Pitney liked dope peddling less than child labor.

In 1919, on the basis of unspecified war powers, the Court in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries& Warehouse Co. 72 upheld an act of Congress

flatly banning the sale of distilled spirits for beverage purposes "until the
termination of demobilization.

' 73

What was remarkable about this result

was not that the statute had been enacted after the armistice, for earlier
cases had correctly recognized that some of the military powers in the
Constitution, such as that respecting the raising and maintenance of armies, were not limited to times of actual hostilities. 74 The striking thing
was rather the enormously broad scope the Court was willing, even after
Clause of the Constitution, 4 MINN. L. REv. 247, 261-65 (1920) (giving the standard argument for
limiting the use of the tax power for regulatory purposes but despairing of the Court's ability to
administer meaningful limitations).
71. Other significant federal tax cases of the White period include LaBelle Iron Works v.
United States, 256 U.S. 377 (1921) (Pitney, J.) (holding excess-profits tax consistent with fifth
amendment); Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) (Clarke, J.) (capital
gain from stock sale is "income"); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916) (White, C.J.)
(an almost unreadable opinion upholding an unapportioned income tax after passage of the sixteenth
amendment, adding the surprising dictum that the effect of that provision was to subject all income
taxation to the requirement of geographical uniformity applicable to duties, imposts, and excises
under article I, section 8); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150-52 (1911) (Day, J.) (analogizing from decisions respecting governmental immunity from taxation to conclude rather formalistically, see Riddle, The Supreme Court's Theory of a Direct Tax, 15 MIcH. L. Rv.566, 573 (1917),
that an "excise' on doing business in corporate form was not a direct tax requiring apportionment
according to population even though measured by income). Most notable was the intuitively appealing conclusion in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1920) (Pitney, J., over four dissents),
that a stock dividend was not "income" within the sixteenth amendment because it did not increase
a shareholder's wealth. Justice Brandeis's learned dissent in Eisner cast cold water on this conclusion by suggesting, among other things, that a pro rata share of undistributed corporate profits could
have been taxed as income to the stockholder, id. at 230-31 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); a perceptive
commentator added that cash dividends and wages did not increase the taxpayer's net worth any
more than stock dividends, because both involved the mere exchange of one asset for another of
equal value. See Warren, Taxability of Stock Dividends as Income, 33 HARV. L. REv.885, 887-88
(1920). For defense of the decision, see Clark, Eisner v. Macomber and Some Income Tax Problems,
29 YALE L.J. 735 (1920). See also the export-tax decisions noted infra note 145.
72. 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
73. Id. at 153.
74. E.g., Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 507 (1871), discussedin D. CURRIE, supra
note 16, at 314 n.192: the power to suppress insurrections "is not limited to victories in the field and
the dispersion of the insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the
immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress." Indeed, like that of Justice Hughes in Shreveport, Brandeis's opinion in Hamilton was rather
modest on this score. Instead of making the broad argument traced in Stewart v. Kahn, he insisted
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Hammer v. Dagenhart, to give to such powers during the time they did
apply. Indeed Justice Brandeis's opinion does not really address the crit-

ical question why the prohibition of liquor was necessary and proper to
75
the exercise of any of the war powers.
The statute stated that its purpose was to "conserv[e] the man

power of the Nation, and to increase efficiency in the production of arms,
munitions, ships, food, and clothing for the Army and Navy" 76-apparently on the theory that drunken citizens make poor soldiers and inefficient producers of military supplies. 77 The connection is real, but the
implications are staggering: Congress may regulate anything that has an

effect on the efficiency of the armed forces. That, like the broad construction of the tax power in Doremus, would seem to leave precious little

beyond the reach of Congress. 78 And this time not a single Justice
79

disagreed.
Finally, in the 1920 case of Missouri v. Holland,8 0 the Court over
two unexplained dissents upheld a treaty protecting migratory birds despite the assumption that Congress could not have accomplished the
same result by statute. 8 1 At one point, building upon an error made by
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, Holmes's opinion for the
only that the wartime emergency had not ended even though some time had passed since the end of
the shooting. Hamilton, 251 U.S. at 158-63.
75. The opinion dealt also with the issue of confiscation, with an issue of statutory construction,
and with the impact of the intervening ratification of the eighteenth amendment. Hamilton, 251 U.S.
at 163-68. The validity of a prohibition statute during actual hostilities seems not to have been
contested. See id. 160-61.
76. Act of Nov. 21, 1918, ch. 212, 40 Stat. 1045, 1046.
77. See Hamilton, 251 U.S. at 153. See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 142
(1948) (prohibition not only "conserved manpower and increased efficiency of production" but also
"helped to husband the supply of grains and cereals depleted by the war effort").
78. Indeed, Justice Brandeis went out of his way in Hamilton, as had Holmes in his Hammer
dissent, 247 U.S. at 278-79, and Day in Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93-94, to stress that neither the effect
on local interests nor the motive of Congress was relevant to the scope of congressional power.
Hamilton, 251 U.S. at 156, 161.
79. See also Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 299-301 (1920) (Brandeis, J., over four
dissents) (allowing Congress to specify for ease of administration that any beverage containing 1/2%
of alcohol was intoxicating); Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 183 (1919)
(White, C.J.) (upholding federal authority to take over telecommunications during wartime); McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397, 399 (1919) (Day, J.) (upholding federal prohibition of brothel
within five miles of military base as incidental to the raising and support of armies); Selective Draft
Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 377-88 (1918) (White, C.J.) (impressively invoking history of compulsory
military service to uphold military draft); 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 516-40
(discussing the war power cases).
80. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
81. Id. at 431-35; see also id. at 435 (Van Devanter and Pitney, JJ., dissenting). Technically
speaking, the challenge was to a federal statute implementing the treaty. Since the treaty was upheld, the statute was easily found a necessary and proper means of carrying it out. Id. at 432. For
the interesting role played by Chief Justice White in the migratory-bird controversy, see 9 A.
BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 477-79.
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Court came close to the horrifying suggestion that the treaty power was
not limited by other provisions at all because "Acts of Congress are the

supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority
of the United States."'8 2 Later in the opinion, however, he based his
holding on the conclusion that the treaty was within federal authority
because the subject involved "a national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude" that "can be protected only by national action in concert
'83
with another power."

It was just as well Holmes did not rest his holding upon the existence of a "national interest" alone; the Framers' careful enumeration of
what they considered in the national interest suggested they did not wish
to leave it to the judges to decide what powers the central government
deserved. 84 More to the point was Holmes's insistence that the problem
could be solved only by international action; the significant fact was that
migratory birds were a legitimate matter of international concern. In
light of tradition, as Justice Field had said in an earlier formulation that
Holmes did not bother to quote, 85 that was what the treaty power was all
about.
The conclusion that the treaty power was not restricted to matters
about which Congress could legislate was reasonable enough in light of
this tradition. Moreover, it had been foreshadowed not only by Field's
definition but more strikingly by an ancient decision reaching the same
82. Holland,252 U.S. at 433 (adding that "[i]t is open to question whether the authority of the
United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention"). Cf Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (relying in part on the "in Pursuance" language of the
supremacy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, as support for judicial review of statutes). The reference to
laws made in pursuance of "[t~his Constitution," U.S. CONsT. art. VI (emphasis added), however,
taken in connection with the contrasting mention of treaties made under the authority of the United
States, id., suggests, contrary to Holmes's suggestion, that supremacy was to be extended to treaties
made under the Articles of Confederation, but not to statutes enacted thereunder. See Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 237 (1796) (giving supremacy to a pre-constitutional treaty), discussed
in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 39-41; see also id., at 72-73 (discussing Marbury). Fortunately,
Holmes added that "[w]e do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making
power," appending the mysterious qualification that "they must be ascertained in a different way."
Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
83. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
84. Compare Governor Randolph's initial resolution proposing that Congress be given authority over all matters that could not be satisfactorily handled by the states, reprinted in 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (rev. ed. 1937) (Randolph's sixth
resolution).
85. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890): "That the treaty power of the United
States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and the governments of
other nations, is clear."
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conclusion even as to the feeble Articles of Confederation.8 6 Neverthe-

less, especially in its inattention to the enunciation of a limiting standard,
Holland was yet another indication that the Justices were not prepared to
do much to ensure the preservation of areas in which the central government could not exercise authority.8 7 Rather they were content to surprise the country every now and then, as in Hammer v. Dagenhart,with
a bolt out of the blue.88
86. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 231-32 (1796), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16,
at 38-41.
87. See generally 2 C. WARREN, supra note 17, at 729-56 (noting Court decisions sustaining the
expansion of Congress's powers under the commerce clause). For a conclusory argument that the
treaty power went no further than Congress's legislative authority, see Boyd, The Treaty-Making
Power ofthe UnitedStates andAlien Land Laws in States, 6 CALIF. L. RaV. 279, 280-81 (1918); for
the narrower contention that migratory birds were not a proper subject of international concern, see
Thompson, State Sovereignty and the Treaty-Making Power, I1 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 247 (1923).
88. In three additional decisions the Court found that Congress had exceeded its enumerated
powers. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566-68, 580 (1911) (Lurton, 3.), was a statesmanlike opinion
that relied on tradition and constitutional structure to resolve an issue as old as the Missouri Compromise, see D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 263-73 (discussing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857)). By reading the equal-footing doctrine, which originated in the uncited Northwest Ordinance, into article IV's provision for admission of "new States . . .into this Union," the Court in
Coyle concluded that Congress could not, in admitting Oklahoma, forbid it to move its capital. In
United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 298 (1920) (White, C.J.), the Court reaffirmed the Waite
Court's conclusion, see D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 402, that Congress had no power to punish
private interference with civil rights. In the strikingly narrow decision in Newberry v. United States,
256 U.S. 232, 256-58 (1921) (McReynolds, J.), Justice Holmes cast the deciding vote to hold that
Congress's power to regulate the "Manner of holding Elections" for members of Congress, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4, did not allow it to regulate spending in a senatorial primary. Pitney and others
persuasively objected that primaries were so closely related to the general election that Congress's
power would be frustrated unless they were included. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 279-82 (Pitney, J.,
joined by Brandeis and Clarke, JJ., concurring in part); id. at 258-69 (White, C.J., concurring in
part); see also id. at 258 (McKenna, J.,
concurring, reserving the question whether the seventeenth
amendment cured the deficiency for future legislation). The rejection in Newberry of the argument
that Congress's inherent authority over federal elections goes beyond article I, section 4-an argument suggested by Justice Miller in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 660-64 (1884), discussed in
D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 394 n.174-contrasts sharply with the conclusion in MacKenzie v.
Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) (McKenna, J.), that Congress could treat marriage to an alien as a
voluntary relinquishment of citizenship:
[Tihere may be powers implied, necessary or incidental to the expressed powers. As a
government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has
the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which concern
its relations and intercourse with other countries.
To which express powers this authority was incidental, the Court did not say. Cf. The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889) (finding Congress's power to exclude aliens inherent in
the concept of national sovereignty), discussed in Fuller I, supra note 16, at 336-37. See Corwin,
ConstitutionalLawin 1920-21, 16 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 22, 23-25 (1922) (agreeing with McReynolds
that "Manner" of holding elections did not include selection of candidates, but approving the notion
of inherent power over primary elections); THE FEDERALIST No. 60 (A. Hamilton) (denying that
"Manner" included "qualifications" for office, which were "fixed in the Constitution"), quoted in
Newberry, 256 U.S. at 255-56; THE FEDERALIST No. 59 (A. Hamilton) (defending the grant of
power over elections on the ground that "every government ought to contain in itself the means of its

HeinOnline -- 1985 Duke L.J. 1128 1985

Vol. 1985:1111]

THE SUPREME COURT. 1910-1921
II.

A.

1129

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

The Civil War Amendments.

1. Economic Due Process. Before White became Chief Justice,
the Court had made substantive due process a painful reality by striking
down a state law limiting bakers' hours in Lochner v. New York 8 9 and a
federal law protecting the jobs of union members in Adair v. United
States.90 Nevertheless the Court had employed the doctrine quite sparingly. 91 It continued to do so during the White period, and Lochner itself
92
was discredited in the process.
Reaffirming Adair in Coppage v. Kansas93 in 1915, a 6-3 majority
invalidated a state law against contracts not to join unions, arguing that
due process had the same meaning in the fourteenth amendment as in the
fifth and that neither encouraging unions nor "leveling inequalities of
fortune" was a legitimate end of the police power. 94 Apart from Coppage
and one other striking decision discussed below, 95 however, invalidations
on substantive due process grounds during the White years were hard to
own preservation") (emphasis in original); 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 967-82
(lamenting the "narrow literalism" and "historical rigidity" of the Newberry decision).
On the question of intergovernmental immunity as a limit on congressional powers, see Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 55-59 (1912) (Van Devanter, J.), which failed to discuss
analogous precedents that limited federal power to regulate or tax state action--eg., Kentucky v.
Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861), discussed in D. CURRIE,supra note 16, at 245-47; Collector
v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 355-in holding
that a state court could not refuse on grounds of public policy to entertain an action based on federal
law. Cf Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (holding, despite an
apparently contrary precedent, see Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S.
373, 375 (1903), that the full faith and credit clause required one state to entertain a suit on another's
judgment). For a ferocious application of McCulloch v. Maryland's converse doctrine preventing
state interference with federal government functions, see Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55
(1920) (Holmes, J.) (state may not require post office driver to obtain operator's license: "The decision in [McCulloch] was not put upon any consideration of degree .
89. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
90. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
91. See generally Fuller I, supra note 16, at 369-86; Bird, The Evolution of Due Process of Law
in the Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 50 (1913) (finding,
especially in light of the decision in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), which upheld a limitation on the working hours of women, little likelihood that the clause would be employed against
"soundly progressive legislation").
92. See generally 2 C. WARREN, supranote 17, at 729-56. The cases are considered in detail in
9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 276-94, 580-609.
93. 236 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1915) (Pitney, J.).
94. Id. at 11, 15-19. Holmes dissented on the straightforward ground that both Adair and
Lochner should be overruled. Id. at 27 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Joined by Hughes, Day-who had
voted with the majority in Adair-triedto show in a separate dissent, id. at 27-42 (Day, J., dissenting), that there was a decisive distinction between discharging union members, as in the earlier case,
and making a promise not to join a union a condition of continued employment.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 121-40 (discussing Buchanan v. Warley).
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find. This was not the result of a drought of opportunity. In this period

the Court upheld against due process objections a great variety of measures, ranging from the outlawing of billiard parlors to emergency rent

control, and from progressive taxes to workmen's compensation laws and
96
other laws making employers strictly liable for work-related injuries.

Most notably, after allowing Congress to require ten hours' wages
for eight hours' work in 1917, 97 the Court in Bunting v. Oregon 98 buried
Lochner without even citing it, upholding a conviction for employing a

worker in a flour mill more than ten hours in a day without paying overtime. 99 Justice McKenna, who had been with the Court in Lochner,
made no effort to show that a miller's work was more dangerous than a
baker's, or indeed that it was dangerous at all. He found the law a reasonable health measure because the state legislature and courts had

found it so, because their judgment was shared by many foreign countries, and because the record did not prove the contrary. 10o The contention that the overtime provision showed the measure to be a regulation of
wages rather than of health-thus serving the goal of "leveling" declared
illegitimate in Coppage-was dismissed by terming overtime pay a pen96. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921) (Holmes, J.) (emergency rent control); Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 422-24, 430 (1919) (Pitney, J.) (absolute liability); New
York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 204-08 (1917) (Pitney, J.) (workmen's compensation);
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 235-46 (1917) (Pitney, J.) (workmen's compensation with compulsory insurance); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916) (White,
C.J.) (progressive tax); Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623, 628-30 (1912) (Lamar, J.) (billiards); see
also LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1921) (Pitney, J.) (excess profits
tax); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914) (McKenna, J.) (regulation of insurance
rates). These decisions represent only the tip of a large iceberg; nearly 200 substantive due process
claims were rejected during the White years, while only about a dozen-mostly involving individual
rate orders-were sustained. For one relatively significant example of the latter, see the 5-4 decision
in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1917) (McReynolds, J.) (striking down a prohibition on
fees charged to job seekers by employment agencies).
97. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 345-46 (1917) (White, C.J.) (stressing that the rule applied
only until parties agreed on new contract, and that it would avoid disastrous rail strike). Day,
McReynolds, Pitney, and Van Devanter dissented, the last two partly on the basis of substantive due
process. Id. at 383. The controversy attracted widespread academic attention. See, e.g., Burdick,
The Adamson Law Decision, 2 CORNELL L.Q. 320 (1917) (suggesting that Court's rationale would
justify a great deal of wage regulation as such); Lauchheimer, The Constitutionalityof the Eight.
Hour RailroadLaw, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 554 (1916) (noting absence of any health justification and
rejection of analogous argument about interruption of commerce in Adair, and concluding that the
law served only the "leveling" purpose condemned in Coppage); Powell, The Supreme Court and the
Adamson Law, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 607 (1917).
98. 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (McKenna, J.).
99. White, Van Devanter, and McReynolds dissented. Id. at 439. For contemporaneous understanding that Lochner was dead, see, e.g., Powell, Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States on ConstitutionalQuestions II, 1914-1917, 12 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 427, 430 (1918).
100. Bunting, 243 U.S. at 438-39. Cf Frankfurter,Hoursof LaborandRealism in Constitutional
Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 353, 370-72 (1916) (arguing that new understanding of industrial dangers
had undermined basis of Lochner).
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alty imposed by Congress to enforce the hour limitation.101
As indicated by the repeated dissents of McReynolds, Van Devanter, White, and to a lesser extent McKenna, the concept of substantive
due process was far from dead.10 2 Like the notion of reserved state powers, however, it was able to rouse itself only on rare and unpredictable

occasions.103

101. Bunting, 243 U.S. at 436-37. Note also the distinction drawn between laws designed to
protect health and laws regulating workers' contracts in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57-59. In Wilson v.
New, 243 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1917), a law increasing wages had been upheld-over dissents drawing
the same distinction-only by emphasizing the separate purpose of preventing a disruptive strike.
102. All four of these Justices dissented in Black v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921), Arizona
Employer's Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 434, 440 (1919), and Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 246 (1917); all but McKenna dissented in Bunting, 243 U.S. at 439; Van Devanter, Pitney, McReynolds, and Day-the latter two on commerce clause grounds-dissented in
Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 364, 373, 388 (1917); Van Devanter, White, and Lamar-before McReynolds's appointment--dissented in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 418 (1914).
See also Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (affirming-by equally divided Court, Brandeis not
participating-decisions upholding minimum wage laws). Agreeing with Professor Powell's contemporaneous speculation in The ConstitutionalIssue in Minimum-Wage Legislation, 2 MINN. L. REv.
1, 1-2 & n.2 (1917), Professor Bickel thought it "quite plain[]" that Pitney had voted with White,
Van Devanter, and McReynolds to strike down the minimum-wage law, adding that the vote had
been 5-4 against validity before the death of Lamar. 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at
598-602. However, although Pitney had been less receptive than the unpredictable McKenna, see,
e.g., id. at 285, to social legislation in both Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), and Wilson v.
New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), in other cases McKenna took the more restrictive view. Moreover, it was
McKenna who took such pains in Bunting to establish that the law there upheld regulated hours
rather than wages and who, after Pitney had left the Court, cast the decisive vote to strike down
minimum wages in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). For these reasons Professor
Powell seems right in concluding that the fourth vote against minimum wages in Stettler was more
probably cast by McKenna. See Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 545, 549 (1924). See generally 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 253 (concluding that even during the early White years, when Progressives were hailing the perceived liberality of
the Court, "it was in literal truth only that the day of the Brewers and the Peckhams was over.
Doctrinally they lived on, and were to flourish again.").
103. Similarly, the overwhelming percentage of economic measures survived challenges under
the equal protection, contract, and taking provisions during the White period.
In the equal protection field the most notable exception without civil rights overtones was F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) (Pitney, J.), finding no plausible basis for a
provision exempting companies doing only out-of-state business from a tax on income earned by
residents outside the state. Brandeis and Holmes dissented, arguing that the measure was a reasonable means of encouraging incorporation of outside businesses in the state. Id. at 418-19 (Brandeis
and Holmes, JJ., dissenting). See also infra note 140 (discussing Truax v. Raich); 9 A. BICKEL & B.
SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 294-300, 640-43 (noting a modest revival of the clause, which had essentially been abandoned until 1914).
As foretold by Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (prohibition against the impairment of contracts does not prevent a state from properly exercising its police powers), discussed in
Fuller , supra note 16, at 334-35, the Court over four dissents-McKenna, White, Van Devanter,
and McReynolds-permitted rent control legislation to override an existing contract on the ground
that the contract clause had not been meant to interfere with the police power. Marcus Brown
Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 198 (1921) (Holmes, J.). Moreover, the old learning that
grants would be interpreted to reserve the power of eminent domain, West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,
47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531-32 (1848), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 213-15, was super-
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There was no doubt that, as Justice Miller had

said in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the central purpose of the Civil War
amendments had been to stamp out official discrimination against
blacks.1a 4 Apart from the striking jury-selection cases of the 1880's,105
however, and the analogous early case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,10 6 the

Supreme Court had done very little to further this purpose on the few
occasions before 1910 that gave it an opportunity to do so. 10 7 The White

10 8
years witnessed a modest improvement in this regard.
One of the things the Fuller Court had done was to uphold, as an
exercise of Congress's power to enforce the thirteenth amendment, a statute making it a federal crime to return a person forcibly to a state of

seded by the view that this power, like the police power, could not be conveyed away. Contributors
to the Pa. Hosp. v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1917) (White, C.J.); see also Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879) (discussing police power), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note
16, at 379-82. Decisions finding particular contracts impaired, however, were still to be found. E.g.,
Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. City of South Bend, 227 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1913) (Lamar, J.) (franchise to
build tracks); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 248 U.S. 525 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (tax exemption); see
also 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 300-05, 643-48 (finding the principal bite of the
clause in public contract cases).
Police power considerations similar to those governing the due process decisions tended also to
determine for the White Court the crucial distinction between regulation and the taking of property,
for which, under decisions of the Fuller Court, see Fuller1, supra note 16, at 370-75, the fourteenth
amendment required even the states to give compensation. On the one hand, for example,
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (McKenna, J.), relied on traditional nuisance principles
to sustain zoning that kept a brickyard out of an urban area. On the other hand, the Court struck
down as an uncompensated taking a requirement that unoccupied upper berths on trains be left
closed, concluding that the rule was not a health measure but merely served to promote the convenience of passengers below. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491,498 (1915) (Lamar,
J., over dissents by Holmes and McKenna). Finally, the Court continued essentially to equate the
implicit requirement that a taking be for a public use with a requirement that it serve a legitimate
public purpose, thus adding to the trend of making as many constitutional questions as possible
depend upon the flexible extraconstitutional notion of the police power. See, e.g., Mt. VernonWoodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916) (Holmes, J.)
(upholding condemnation by private company to generate electric power: "If that purpose is not
public we should be at a loss to say what is. The inadequacy of use by the general public as a
universal test is established."); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911) (Holmes, J.)
(upholding assessment to set up fund for deposit insurance: "[I]t is established by a series of cases
that an ulterior public advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking of private property
for what, in its immediate purpose, is a private use.").
104. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-72 (1873), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 342-43.
105. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
106. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
107. See D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 383-90, 393-402; see generally 9 A. BICKEL & B.
SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 729-990; Fuller I supra note 3, at 369-70; Schmidt, Juries,Jurisdiction,
and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1041
(1982).
108. See 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 725-27 (describing decisions of this
period as "symbols of hope" and concluding that they "mark the first time. . . that the Supreme
Court opened itself in more than a passing way to the promise of the Civil War amendments").
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servitude. 10 9 In Bailey v. Alabama,110 in 1911, the Court went further in

an opinion by Justice Hughes: the state could not make it a crime to
111
break a contract to work.
The Fuller Court's decision had held it immaterial that the em-

ployee had agreed to work; what mattered was that he was compelled to
do so against his will at the time of performance.' 1 2 Bailey took the next

step: "[T]he State could not avail itself of the sanction of the criminal
law to supply the compulsion any more than it could use or authorize the
use of physical force." 1 3 That this was no foregone conclusion was
brought home by Justice Holmes's dissenting observation that the deci-

sion seemed to outlaw all contracts for labor: "If the mere imposition of
such consequences as tend to make a man keep to his promise is the
creation of peonage when the contract happens to be for labor, I do not

see why the allowance of a civil action is not, as well as an indictment
ending in fine.""

4

The challenge Holmes posed was apt, even if his reso-

lution left too much room for reinstating forced labor; yet the majority
did not respond. 1 5
109. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905) (Brewer, J.).
110. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
111. The statute nominally required a fraudulent intent at the time of the contract. However,
because the mere fact of breach was made prima facie evidence of such intent and there was no
practical way to rebut it, the Court treated the case as if the breach itself had been made criminal.
Id. at 233-38.
112. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); see also id. at 216. "This amendment
denounces a status or condition, irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is created." The
point was reiterated in Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242-43. To hold that individuals could sell themselves
into slavery would seem to contradict the textual provision that slavery should not "exist within the
United States," and "involuntary servitude" takes on color from the adjacent reference to slavery.
113. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244.
114. Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., joined by Lurton, J., dissenting). There is an obvious connection
between this reasoning and Holmes's bad-man theory of the law. See O.W. HOLMES, The Path of
the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173-75 (1920) (equating penalties with taxes and arguing
that "[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if
you do not keep it-and nothing else").
115. That damages for breach of a work contract were permissible was acknowledged in both
cases. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242-43; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); 9 A. BICKEL
& B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 869, 888-900 (finding Holmes oblivious here both to "the practical
consequences" of equating criminal punishment with damages and to "questions of degree, which he
liked to say were pretty much all of law," id. at 869, and finding support for the decision in the
traditional reluctance to criminalize or prohibit the breach of a labor contract, id. at 888-900); see
also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914) (Day, J.) (invalidating use of forced labor to pay
off debt incurred when employer paid criminal fine, despite amendment's exception for criminal
sanctions).
Notwithstanding these decisions, the Court declined to apply the amendment literally to situations foreign to the purposes of its authors. First, in Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (McReynolds, J.), partly on the basis of an effective survey of practices under the antislavery provisions of
the Northwest Ordinance and of state constitutions, the Court unanimously upheld a requirement
that able-bodied citizens perform road work, adding that "the term involuntary servitude was in-
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The unanimous decision in Guinn v. United States,11 6 striking down
as a proxy for racial qualifications a literacy test applicable only to those
whose ancestors had been ineligible to vote in 1866, showed that the

Court took the fifteenth amendment as seriously as it had taken the thirteenth in Bailey. 11 7 More generally, Guinn ranks with the great test-oath
cases of 1867118 as healthy evidence that, despite Marshall's understandable qualms about determining legislative motive,' 19 the Court will sometimes infer a forbidden purpose when it is unable to perceive a legitimate
one-as it must if constitutional limitations are not to be evaded at pleasure.120 More doctrinally interesting, however, was the 1917 case of
Buchanan v. Warley, in which the Court gave suprisingly broad scope to
the fourteenth amendment in this field by unanimously invalidating an
ordinance requiring residential segregation by race. 121
From the modem perspective, Buchanan was a peculiar case in two
respects. First, the suit was brought not by a black person seeking to live
inan area reserved for whites, but by a white landowner seeking to enforce a contract of sale against a recalcitrant black buyer who declined to
perform in reliance on the ordinance. 122 Second, the decision was based

not on the equal protection clause but on substantive due process: the
tended to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery. . . . and certainly was not
intended to interdict enforcement of those duties which individuals owe to the State, such as services
in the army, on the jury, etc." Id. at 332-33. As foreshadowed in the passage just quoted, two years
later the Court without dissent rejected a thirteenth amendment attack on the military draft. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (White, C.J.). Similar historical evidence was cited in
connection with the distinct question whether the measure fell within the power to raise armies, but
the servitude issue was treated as obvious, and the decisive precedent of the Butler case was not
cited. Id. at 390.
116. 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (White, CJ.).
117. Id. at 363 (a statesmanlike opinion by a former Confederate soldier emphasizing that a
contrary holding would make the amendment "wholly inoperative because susceptible of being rendered inapplicable by mere forms of expression. . . resting upon no discernible reason other than
the purpose to disregard the prohibitions of the Amendment"). See generally 9 A. BICKEL & B.
SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 908-90 (showing, inter alia, how the Court strained to resolve a serious
remedial question in a way that enabled it to reach the merits); Monnet, The Latest PhaseofNegro
Disfranchisement, 26 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1912) (previewing Guinn).
118. Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867), discussedin D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at
292-96; Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), discussedin D. CURIE, supra note 16,
at 292-96.
119. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 129-30, discussedin D. CURRIE, supra note 16,
at 129.
120. For analogous inferences of impermissible administrative purposes, see Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881) (uniform absence of blacks from juries), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 374 (1886) (uniform denial of permits to Chinese), both discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16,
at 386-87. Contrast the Court's reluctance to look behind a pretextual exercise of federal tax power
in United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), discussed supra notes 65-71 and accompanying
text.
121. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (Day, J.).
122. Id. at 72-73.
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ordinance took property of the white landowner without due process of
3

law. 12

At first glance one may be tempted to explain the invocation of due
process as a clever means of circumventing the general rule forbidding a
litigant to assert the constitutional rights of third parties, for it enabled
Justice Day to reject an objection to standing on the express ground that
the seller was asserting his own property rights and not the interests of
potential black residents. 124 This did not explain, however, why the suit
had been brought by a white property owner in the first place.
The fact that the defendant was black and the existence of a contractual provision releasing the buyer from his obligation if he could not occupy the premises suggest collusion to manufacture a case in which the
defendant could be relied upon to take a dive.125 An examination of the
precedents, however, reveals an even more pressing reason for choosing
such an unlikely plaintiff. Odd as it may seem in retrospect, the seller's
chances of prevailing on the merits were substantially better than those
of the immediate victims of racial discrimination. The ordinance did not

impose disabilities on blacks alone; it forbade members of either race to
move onto a block dominated by members of the other. 126 Comparable
measures touching sexual relations and transportation having passed
muster in the Supreme Court on the ground that they imposed equal
disabilities on both races, 127 an equal protection challenge in Buchanan
faced almost certain disaster on the rocks of the separate-but-equal
128
doctrine.
123. Id. at 74-81.
124. Id. at 72-73.
125. See id. at 69-70; 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 789, 805 (giving additional
facts bearing on this question). It was remarkable enough that the Justices did not throw the case
out of court, as Holmes came close to suggesting in an undelivered dissent, reprinted in id. at folio
following p. 592. CfC Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 254-56 (1850) (dismissing collusive
action brought by parties who had no real dispute and whose interests were adverse to others not
parties to the suit), discussedin D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 263 n.197. But cf. Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810) (reaching decision on the merits, but suggesting that case may have
been collusively brought), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 128-36.
126. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 70-71.
127. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), discussedin Fuller I, supranote 16, at 369-70; Pace
v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16 at 387-90. Justice Day
distinguished Plessy on the ground that the measure there involved had not deprived blacks of the
right to transportation and had been upheld as separate but equal. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 79.
128. See Hunting, The Constitutionalityof Race Distinctions and the Baltimore Negro Segregation Ordinance, 11 COLUM. L. REv. 24 (1911); Pollak, RacialDiscriminationand JudicialIntegrity:
A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1959). A few years before Buchanan, in
McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161-63 (1914) (Hughes, J.), the Court had taken a
step that Professor Schmidt views as a challenge to the whole structure of Jim Crow laws. 9 A.
BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 775-84. It did so by insisting, in a case ultimately dismissed for want of standing, that separate facilities in fact be equal: if luxury train facilities were
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The due process attack, at the time, was far more promising. At
least since the 1898 rate case of Smyth v. Ames, 12 9 it had been the law

that any measure arbitrarily impairing property interests offended the
due process clause. 130 The right to sell, as the Buchanan Court concluded, was a normal concomitant of property.13 1 It remained only to

demonstrate that the segregation ordinance imposed a limitation on that
right not justified by the ubiquitous police power.

A similar attack on a statute forbidding integrated teaching in private schools had failed in Berea College v. Kentucky in 1908.132 The reasoning of that opinion, however, seemed to encourage an attack on the

residential segregation in Buchanan. The Berea Court had taken great
care to explain that the complaining school was a corporation, that the
state had reserved the right to revise its charter, and that the possible
invalidity of the statute as applied to individuals was irrelevant.
Buchanan emphasized all this in distinguishing Berea.133

On the police power question Justice Day was brief. Though the
city's professed goal of protecting the public peace by preventing racial

conflicts was a legitimate one, it "cannot be promoted by depriving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges."' 134 This was circular;
as the Court had often held, if the police power justification was adequate

there was no deprivation of constitutional rights. 135 More to the point
was the observation that the ordinance was not well tailored either to
achieving racial peace or to preserving property values; it fell far short of
forbidding blacks and whites to come into allegedly dangerous proximprovided for whites, they must be provided for blacks as well. But see Cumming v. Richmond
County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (Harlan, J.) (refusing to enjoin spending for white high
school largely on remedial ground that injunction would not benefit black plaintiffs, but also expressing doubt whether equal protection required that blacks as well as whites have public high school).
The argument has been made that Buchanan was distinguishable from Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S.
583 (1883), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), because segregation was more difficult to
justify in the context of residence than in sexual relations or in transportation, see Note, 18 COLUM.
L. REv. 147, 148-50 (1918); that analysis overlooks the fact that separation had been upheld because
it was not inequality at all and thus required no justification.
129.

169 U.S. 466 (1898).

130. See Fuller I, supra note 16, at 374-75, 384.
131. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 74.
132. 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (Brewer, J.).
133. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 79. The essence oftheBerea holding was thus that the right to teach
white and black children together had never been among the corporation's property rights. See 9 A.
BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 731-32.
134. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 80-81.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 87-103; Fuller I,supra note 16, at 378-82; D. CUJRRIE,
supra note 16, at 369-78.
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and it allowed property to be "acquired by undesirable white
neighbors or put to disagreeable though lawful uses." 137 In short, the
Court seems to have held the ordinance invalid because it was a poorly
138
designed means of achieving legitimate ends.
It is obvious that the Court indulged in far stricter scrutiny of the
ity,136

relation between ends and means in Buchanan than it had in most other
substantive due process or equal protection cases, and that it did so without saying why. 139 It is remarkable that in 1917 it was prepared to do so
unanimously, though obliquely, in the service of racial justice. 14
136. "[I]t is to be noted. . . that the employment of colored servants is permitted, and nearby
residences of colored persons not coming within the blocks. . . are not prohibited." Buchanan, 245
U.S. at 81.
137. Id. at 82.
138. This disposition raised the interesting question whether the segregation ordinance in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), would have survived attack on the ground that it took the railroad's property without due process, but no such case reached the Supreme Court.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 89-103; Fuller I, supra note 16, at 378-82. The basis of
Holmes's aborted dissent, see 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at folio following p. 592,
was that the ordinance did not infringe the plaintiffs property rights. See also id. at 815 (adding that
Day himself had dissented from both Lochner and Coppage). This contrast seems to have escaped
the notice of Professor Roche, who explained Buchanan on the basis that "entrepreneurial liberty
was even more sacrosanct than racism." Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age ofEnterprise, 31 U. CHI. L.
REV. 103, 123 (1963).
140. See 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 813-17 (arguing from the opinion's
pointed references to the racial purpose of the amendment that, whatever the technical basis of
Buchanan, "it was the element of racial discrimination touching property rights and not a neutral
conception of property rights that produced the decision"). See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915) (Hughes, J.), which employed the equal protection clause for the first time to strike down
discrimination against aliens as such-as contrasted with the narrower racial discrimination against
Chinese in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). "The discrimination against aliens in the wide
range of employments to which the act relates is made an end in itself. . . ." Truax, 239 U.S. at 41.
The implication seemed to be that a simple preference for one group over another was an illegitimate
goal under the clause. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1689, 1712-13 (1984). Later the same term, when a state was allowed to discriminate against aliens
in public-works employment on the basis of a decision holding the Lochner rule against hour limitations inapplicable to such employees, Truax was not mentioned. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175
(1915) (McKenna, J.) (citing Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903), discussedin FullerI, supranote
16, at 380 n.334). For an early recognition thatAtkin might not be on point see Powell, Decisionsof
the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates on ConstitutionalQuestionsIII, 1914-1917, 12 AM. POL. ScI.
REv. 640, 640-41 (1918) (doubting that the result would have been the same if the state had excluded Methodists or Republicans). Truax itself, moreover, had ignored a unanimous decision rendered earlier the same year dismissing as "frivolous" a fourteenth. amendment attack on a law
forbidding aliens to own land. See Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U.S. 580, 582-83 (1915) (White,
C.J.). For less progressive approaches to civil rights in the area of race relations itself see the unanimous decision in Jones v. Jones, 234 U.S. 615, 616-19 (1914) (Lurton, J.) (conclusorily rejecting an
equal protection challenge to a limitation on inheritance by former slaves, without identifying any
justification for the rule), and see infra note 145 (discussing South Covington & CS. Ry. v.
Kentucky).
Cutting across both economic and civil liberty categories was the important decision in Home
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 288-89 (1913) (White, C.J.), which unanimously and painstakingly buried the recurrent notion that actions of state officials who misuse au-
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thority granted to them by the state were not state action for fourteenth amendment purposeswithout mentioning the unanimous and apparently contradictory fifth amendment holding in Hooe
v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 336 (1910) (Harlan, J.), that the unauthorized taking of private
property by a federal officer "is not the act of the Government."
In the field of procedural due process, the White Court for the first time held that a state could
not delegate legislative authority to private individuals, Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137,
142-45 (1912) (McKenna, J.) (invalidating authorization of two-thirds of property owners to set
building line for entire block); but cf. Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531
(1917) (Clarke, J.) (allowing neighbors to waive billboard ban and distinguishing Eubank by asserting distinction between imposing and removing restrictions), and struck down several criminal laws
as so vague that they did not give fair warning of what they forbade, e.g., United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-93 (1921) (White, C.J.) ("unreasonable" prices); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221-24 (1914) (Holmes, J.) (sales above "real value"); see also
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920) (McReynolds, J., with three
Justices dissenting) (invoking inadequate precedents for otherwise-unexplained conclusion that due
process required judicial review by court exercising "independent judgment as to both law and facts"
of rate order challenged as confiscatory); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 122 (1916) (White, C.J.)
(conclusorily dismissing due process objection to ban on injunctions against collecting federal taxes);
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915) (Holmes, J.) (giving
thoughtful explanation of why no hearing was required before general increase in property valuation). For discussions of Ben Avon, see 9 A. BiCKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 609-30 (pointing out that the rate had been set, see FullerI, supranote 16, at 371-74 (discussing Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890)), without a full quasi-judicial hearing); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 636-53 (1965) (noting that impact of Ben Avon has been
greatly mitigated by later decisions); Brown, The Functions of Courts and Commissions in Public
Utility Rate Regulation, 38 HARV. L. REv. 141, 148-49 (1924) (arguing that despite "legislative"
effect of rates, administrative agency had afforded adequate quasi-judicial hearing); Freund, The
Right to a JudicialReview in Rate Controversies,27 W. VA. L.Q. & B. 207, 210-11 (1921) (arguing
that de novo review entailed judicial assumption of administrative functions).
For the conflict of laws aspects of due process, see International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579, 582-83 (1914) (Day, J.), and the more elaborate Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v.
Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1915) (White, C.J.), both of which read into the due process clause,
as a limitation on the personal jurisdiction of state courts over foreign corporations, the "doing
business" requirement that had been developed in other contexts). See also Flexner v. Farson, 248
U.S. 289 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (holding that service on an individual's former agent was inadequate
and more questionably suggesting that an individual might never become suable simply by doing
business in the state); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916) (Brandeis, J.) (relying on a
state's interest in public safety to uphold a requirement that a nonresident motorist appoint a local
agent to accept service of process); United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 304-07 (1914) (White,
C.J.) (unanimously holding territorial limit on taxation that fourteenth amendment imposes on the
states, see Fuller I, supra note 16, at 378 n.317, inapplicable to United States despite indistinguishable terms of fifth amendment). Both New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 162-65 (1914)
(White, C.J.), and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 373-77 (1918) (McReynolds, J.,
over a powerful Brandeis dissent for four Justices), applied the territorialist doctrine of Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), discussed in FullerI, supra note 16, at 375-78, to strike down the
application of Missouri law to contracts that the Court found had been made in New York. In sharp
and unexplained contrast with the decisions just noted, and with the Court's unexplained and confusing use of the full faith and credit clause as a limitation on choice of law in Supreme Council of
Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 541-46 (1915) (White, C.J.) (power of fraternal insurance
society to raise rates was governed solely by law of its state of incorporation), the Court in Kryger v.
Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916) (Brandeis, 3., for a unanimous Court), flatly stated that a possibly
"mistaken application of doctrines of the conflict of laws in deciding that the cancellation of a land
contract is governed by the law of the situs instead of the place of making and performance" was
"purely a question of local common law. . . with which this court is not concerned." See Dodd,
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B. Admiralty and Commerce.
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 141 over four vehement dissents, the
Court held that a state workmen's compensation law could not constitutionally be applied to a longshoreman who had met his death while unloading an interstate ship on navigable waters. 142 "If New York can
subject foreign ships coming into her ports to such obligations as those
imposed by her Compensation Statute," wrote Justice McReynolds,
"other States may do likewise. The necessary consequence would be destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the
Constitution was designed to establish; and freedom of navigation between the States and with foreign countries would be seriously hampered
and impeded."

143

The stress on uniformity in Jensen is highly reminiscent of the Cooley doctrine, which the Court had recently wakened from a twenty-year
slumber 44 as a test for the validity of state laws that arguably infringed
Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce. 14 5 The Court
based its decision, however, not on the commerce clause but on article
The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Fieldof Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV.
L. REv. 533, 556, 560 (1926) (conceding that "it certainly cannot be said there are as yet any settled
and sharply defined doctrines as to the relation between constitutional law and conflicts," but adding
that the Court had "committed itself to. . .making itself, to some extent, a tribunal for bringing
about uniformity in the field of conflicts"). For an excellent discussion of the history of personal
jurisdiction over foreign corporations down to the Riverside decision see G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77-87 (1918). For refutation of Flexner's suggestion that the power to exclude was the sole basis of a state's power over
corporations engaged in business within their borders, see id. and Scott, Jurisdictionover Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 HARV. L. REv. 871 (1919), both pointing to decisions
involving corporations engaged solely in interstate commerce.

141. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
142. Id. at 217-18; see also id. at 218-55 (Holmes and Pitney, JJ., joined by Brandeis and Clarke,
JJ., dissenting).
143. Id. at 217.
144. See Fuller I, supra note 16, at 364-69 (noting the demise during the Fuller years (188919 10) of the Cooley "uniformity test").
145. See, for example, Port Richmond & B.P. Ferry Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 234
U.S. 317 (1914) (Hughes, J.), in which the Court equated the test laid down in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852) (Curtis, J.) (upholding local pilotage rules because subject
did not require uniformity), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 230-34, with the common
distinction between direct and indirect burdens on commerce. Unlike "those subjects which require
a general system or uniformity of regulation," the Court held, the question of ferry rates from one
state to another "presents a situation essentially local requiring regulation according to local conditions." Port Richmond, 234 U.S. at 330, 332. For other examples of similar reasoning, see The
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399-403 (1913) (Hughes, J.) (upholding local railroad rates
that arguably diverted interstate traffic), and Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252
U.S. 23, 29-31 (1920) (Day, J.) (upholding state regulation of rates charged for gas in interstate sale
to ultimate consumer). With the PortRichmond case, compare City of Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co., 234 U.S. 333 (1914), also announced by Justice Hughes the same day, which
struck down a sanction for operating a ferry across international waters without a license, not be-
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III's provision extending federal judicial power to "all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction." 146 Under that clause, said McReynolds, "no
[state] legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed
by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic

features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations." 1 47
cause the Court found any difference between foreign and interstate commerce, but because it considered prohibition a more severe burden on commerce than mere rate regulation.
The police power, not surprisingly, also continued to play a prominent part in the more than
one hundred decisions of the White period respecting the negative effect of the commerce clause
upon state laws. For example, in a third case decided on the same day as PortRichmond and City of
Sault Ste. Marie,Justice Hughes spoke essentially in police power terms when he upheld a state law
requiring that locomotives be equipped with electric headlights; Hughes rested his decision on "the
settled principle that. . . the States are not denied the exercise of their power to secure safety in the
physical operation of railroad trains . . . , even though such trains are used in interstate commerce." Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 291 (1914); see also Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622-24 (1915) (McReynolds, J.) (invoking police power and need for road repair
in concluding that requirement of vehicle registration and the attendant fee were not "direct" burdens on commerce). That the police power was not an invariable trump, however, was confirmed
when--over three pointed dissents seeming to argue just that-the Court struck down a state safety
law that would allegedly have required that an interstate train stop at 124 grade crossings in 123
miles, which would have more than doubled the time of the journey. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1917) (McKenna, J.) (once again terming the burden on commerce
"direct"). This decision had been foreshadowed when the Fuller Court dismissed a previous attack
on the same law for want of sufficient specificity as to the burden on commerce. Southern Ry. v.
King, 217 U.S. 524, 533-34, 537 (1910), discussedin FullerI, supranote 16, at 367-68; see also South
Covington & C.S. Ry. v. City of Covington, 235 U.S. 537, 547-49 (1915) (Day, J.) (upholding certain
safety regulations as applied to interstate streetcars but finding others to be "unreasonable" and thus
"direct" burdens); South Covington & C.S. Ry. v. Kentucky, 252 U.S. 399, 403-04 (1920) (McKenna, J.) (requirement that same streetcars be segregated by race was "not a regulation of interstate commerce" because the law applied only to the instate portion of the journey-which had been
equally true, as Day observed in dissent, in the earlier case). In neither of the South Covington &
CS. Ry. cases did the Court discuss whether the regulation of an interstate streetcar serving a single
metropolitan area was "local" within the principle of the PortRichmond case, see Port Richmond,
234 U.S. at 330, 332.
A similar understanding of what made a burden on commerce "direct" was suggested by Justice
Pitney outside the police power context in United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S.
321, 329 (1918), holding that an apportioned and nondiscriminatory income tax imposed a less direct burden on commerce than did the comparable gross-receipts taxes, see, e.g., Meyer v. Wells,
Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298, 302 (1912) (Holmes, J.), that the Court had previously struck down; the
latter more seriously deterred commerce because they "affect[] each transaction in proportion to its
magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profitable." United States Glue, 247 U.S. at 329. Compare the analogous decision that a nondiscriminatory income tax could be applied to the export
business without infringing the prohibition of export taxes in article I, section 9. William E. Peck &
Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 173 (1918) (Van Devanter, J.) (distinguishing nondiscriminatory tax
reaching marine insurance for exported goods as "'so directly and closely' bear[ing] on the 'process
of exporting' as to be in substance a tax on the exportation") (citing Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v,
United States, 237 U.S. 19, 25 (1915) (Hughes, J.)).
146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
147. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216.

HeinOnline -- 1985 Duke L.J. 1140 1985

Vol. 1985:1111]

THE SUPREME COURT. 1910-1921

1141

Jensen was not the first opinion to suggest that the admiralty clause
had a limiting effect on state laws. Justice Bradley had laid the foundation for such a conclusion in an 1875 decision-holding that maritime
law did not provide a lien for services rendered in a vessel's home portby announcing that the governing case law was federal:
The general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers
and statesmen of the country when the Constitution was adopted, was
most certainly intended and referred to when it was declared in that
instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall extend "to
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
• . .It certainly could not have been the intention to place the
rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of
the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or
with foreign states.148
Though Bradley had not cited it, there was evidence to support the common-sense inference that uniform laws had been among the goals of the
admiralty clause, 14 9 and the federal courts had looked to international
customs in deciding maritime cases since the beginning. 150 Bradley had
conceded, however, that there was "quite an extensive field of border
legislation on commercial subjects (generally local in character) which
may by regulated by State laws until Congress interposes," 15 1 including
pilotage laws, such as that upheld against commerce clause attack in
Cooley,152 and the home-port liens that were implicated in the case before
153
him.
Under Chief Justice Fuller, the Court had begun to flesh out Bradley's vision, upholding in admiralty suits state wrongful death statutes
but not state laws denying municipal tort liability or creating liens for
148. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574-75 (1875), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note
16, at 404, 428.
149. Though Hamilton had explained only that maritime cases "so generally depend on the law
of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations
which are relative to the public peace," THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton), Madison and
Randolph had both referred to the need for uniformity of decision, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN

1787, at 532, 571 (J.Elliot 2d ed.

1836), if only in the context of foreign relations.
150. E.g., The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819), cited in The Lottawanna, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) at 571; see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 45-46 (2d ed. 1975).
151. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 581.
152. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 315-21.
153. In The Lottawanna, Bradley held that there was no lien as a matter of state law. The
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 578-79.
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services rendered to a foreign vessel's independent contractor.1 54 Once it

was accepted that there was a federal common law of the sea, the last two
decisions were easy to explain: in both the Court had found that the state

law conflicted with federal law.1 55 Thus McReynolds was on familiar

ground when he declared in Jensen that state laws could not "contravene[] the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or work[]

material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime
law." 156 As the dissenters observed, however, the Court had never

before followed the logic of Justice Bradley's position to the extent of
holding that state law could not be applied to maritime cases brought in
state tribunals.1 57 Perhaps more important, McReynolds made no attempt to show that workers' compensation contradicted any policy of the
maritime law. 158 Rather, he based his conclusion squarely upon the

third branch of his test: the state law "interfere[d] with the proper harmony and uniformity of [maritime] law in its international and interstate
1 59
relations."
Originally suggested by Justice Bradley's 1875 dictum, the uniform-

ity criterion of the test applied in Jensen had been an alternative basis for
154. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 403-05 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (wrongful death statute); The
Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 194-99 (1903) (Brown, J.) (liens on foreign vessel); Workman v. New York
City, 179 U.S. 552, 557-63 (1900) (White, J.); see Fuller I, supra note 16, at 364 n.245.
155. See The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 196 (1903); Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552,
558, 563 (1900); cf G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 150, at 48 ("[Sltate legislation is clearly
invalid where it actually conflicts with the established general maritime law or federal statutes.")
The supremacy clause speaks only of the Constitution, treaties, and statutes, not of federal common
law. If article III provided for a supreme federal law, however, a contrary state rule would arguably
offend the Constitution itself, or the statute granting admiralty jurisdiction. This same principle
explains the White Court's later conclusions that state law could neither abolish limitations on maritime personal injury liability, Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 382 (1918) (McReynolds, J.), nor contradict the maritime rule that oral contracts were enforceable, Union Fish Co. v.
Erickson, 248 U.S. 308, 312-14 (1919) (Day, J.). In both cases, however, the Court unnecessarily
invoked Jensen's uniformity doctrine as well. See Union Fish Co., 248 U.S. at 313; Chelentis, 247
U.S. at 382.
156. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216.
157. Id. at 222, 239 (Holmes and Pitney, JJ., dissenting). See authorities cited in Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. CT.REv. 158, 161 n.14; see generally
Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy ofAdmiralty over the Common Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV.
647 (1921) (arguing against Jensen on essentially the same ground as the dissenters). Nevertheless,
the purpose of uniformity that underlay the Court's conclusion that article III envisioned a federal
common law demanded the application of that body of law in state courts as well. See Currie, supra
at 180-85.
158. Compare The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907), where the Court had allowed a state wrongful death statute to be applied in admiralty after having held that the creation of such a remedy was
beyond judicial competence in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213 (1886). Although McReynolds
did not do so, he might have argued, by analogy to Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372
(1918), that in limiting recovery for personal injury maritime law adhered to a policy that would be
contradicted by allowing workers' compensation in a maritime death case.
159. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216.
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each of the Fuller Court's two decisions adverse to state law. 160 Textually it was more difficult to infer such preemption from a provision granting judicial power than to hold an express grant of lawmaking power
exclusive. In terms of the Framers' purposes, however, it followed as easily as the comparable principle derived from the commerce clause. 161 The
primary difficulty in Jensen was in applying the uniformity principle.
To begin with, McReynolds had to acknowledge precedent establishing that uniformity was not unduly disrupted by "the right given to
recover in death cases," 162 and Jensen itself was a death case. This difficulty was arguably more semantic than real, since the death law previously sustained had merely given an additional remedy for violation of
duties already existing; the compensation law, imposing liablility without
violation of duty, arguably placed the shipowner at a greater disadvantage in planning his conduct. The more serious obstacle was that numerous state laws imposing additional primary duties in the interest of safety
had been upheld against challenges based upon the analogous principle
of the commerce clause. Most striking of all was the fact that, on the
very day Jensen was decided, Justice McReynolds had also written for an
undivided Court in rejecting a commerce clause objection to applying a
state workmen's compensation law to a seaman's shipboard injury: "In
the absence of congressional legislation the settled general rule is that
without violating the Commerce Clause the States may legislate concerning relative rights and duties of employers and employees while within
their borders although engaged in interstate commerce."' 163 Justices
Holmes and Pitney, in their separate Jensen dissents, found it impossible
to explain why the admiralty clause should have a greater preclusive effect than the commerce clause, since both were said to have the same
purpose; and Justice McReynolds did not bother to tell them. 164
160. The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 195 (1903); Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 558
(1900).
161. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 150, at 48, 406 (arguing that, although McReynolds had taken the Lottawanna quotation out of context, "[i]f there is any sense at all in making
maritime law a federal subject, then there must be some limit set to the power of the states to
interfere in the field of its working"); Morrison, Workmen's Compensation and the MaritimeLaw, 38
YALE L.J 472, 476 (1929) (finding difficulties of administering Jensen test "offset by the logical and
practical advantage of having the rights of the parties . . . determinable by a single standard").
162. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216 (citing The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907)).
163. Valley S.S. Co. v. Wattawa, 244 U.S. 202, 204 (1917) (citations omitted); cf, eg., Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914) (upholding state law requiring locomotive headlights); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888) (upholding state engineer-licensing law as applied to
interstate trains). The admiralty clause had not been properly invoked by the employer in Wattawa.
See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 204-05.
164. McReynolds might have argued that the availability of a federal forum empowered to apply
federal common law in maritime cases made the consequences of preemption less intolerable in
admiralty than in commerce, an area where-even before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
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The contrast was accentuated three years later in Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart,165 when the Court held, over the same four dissents, that a
state could not give compensation in maritime cases even with congressional consent.166 In the commerce clause context the Court had held
that the constitutional purposes were satisfied by a congressional deter-

mination that the subject did not require uniformity.

67

Evidently uni-

(1938)-the federal courts could make law only if the parties were of diverse citizenship. Instead he
made the apparent inconsistency all the more glaring by invoking the commerce clause precedents to
demonstrate the necessity for finding a similar limitation in the admiralty clause, by "the same character of reasoning." Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217.
165. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
166. Id. at 154-55; see also id. at 166-70 (Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis, and Clarke, JJ., dissenting).
167. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) (upholding federal statute allowing states to prohibit sale
of liquor in original package after Court had barred states from doing so on commerce clause
grounds), discussed in Fuller I, supra note 16, at 361-62. McReynolds had the temerity to cite this
decision for the proposition that "Congress cannot transfer its legislative power to the States,"
Knickerbocker, 253 U.S. at 164, as if it supported him. He made no effort to distinguish its holding.
See also Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (White, C.J., over unexplained
dissents by Holmes and Van Devanter) (upholding federal statute forbidding shipment of liquor into
state for use in violation of state law). Since the federal statute in Clarkmade the breach of state law
unlawful as a matter of federal law, it raised an issue of delegation not settled by Rahrer,which had
only recognized Congress's authority to remove a constitutional barrier to the effectiveness of state
law as such. It was an issue, moreover, that could not be resolved, as more typical delegation questions could, by finding interstitial lawmaking power inherent in the President's executive power. See
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (Lamar, J.) (upholding authority to adopt regulations
"to preserve the [national] forests from destruction"); Buttfield v. Stranaham, 192 U.S. 420 (1904)
(upholding federal statute authorizing Secretary of Treasury to make regulations to effectuate exclusion of low-grade teas), discussedin Fuller I, supra note 16, at 339-43; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892) (upholding federal statute that allowed President to suspend statutory provisions relating to
free introduction of sugar), discussed in FullerI, supra note 16, at 339-43. No doubt because the case
had grown out of a state's attempt to enforce its own law-the federal statute oddly having provided
for no penalties-the Court in Clark found Rahrerindistinguishable. See also United States v. Hill,
248 U.S. 420 (1919) (Day, J.) (relying on ClarkDistilling to settle the validity of afederal prosecution under a later and more stringent provision, over a dissent by McReynolds and Clarke suggesting
that a different question was presented). In Knickerbocker, McReynolds, who had concurred in the
result in Clark without explanation, Clark, 242 U.S. at 332 (McReynolds, J. concurring), chose to
emphasize passages in the earlier opinion stressing that Congress could have banned the shipment of
liquor altogether and declared that the admiralty clause was different. Except for the unexplained
fact that in admiralty there was a federal common law, the reasons he gave were equally applicable
to the commerce clause. Knickerbocker, 253 U.S. at 165-66. For early appreciation of the inconsistency, see Corwin, ConstitutionalLawin 1919-1920 (pt. 2), 15 AM. POL. Sd. REV. 52, 55-56 (1921).
For criticism of Knickerbocker, see Morrison, supra note 161, at 480 ("The fairer conclusion would
seem to be that paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law includes the power to
determine the extent to which uniformity of rule is needed."); Currie, supra note 157, at 191 ("It is
difficult to understand why the federal interest in a free commerce, whether land or sea, is in need of
protection from the action of the very body to whose care it is intrusted."). The abundant commentary on the problems raised by ClarkDistilling and Hill includes Cushman, supranote 62, at 409-12
(criticizing Hill on distinct ground that statute in question was not legitimate regulation of commerce because Congress had neither determined for itself that liquor was harmful nor limited its
action to reinforcing state policy); Orth, The Webb-Kenyon Law Decision, 2 CORNELL L.Q. 283
(1917); Rogers, The Constitutionalityof the Webb-Kenyon Bill, 1 CALIF. L. REV. 499 (1913) (noting
that President Taft had vetoed the bill on constitutional grounds).

HeinOnline -- 1985 Duke L.J. 1144 1985

Vol. 1985:1111]

THE SUPREME COURT. 1910-1921

1145

formity was more important in admiralty than in commerce, but nobody
had ever explained why.
C. Freedom of Expression.
1. Schenck v. United States. Alleged to have helped circulate to
draftees a document encouraging them to assert their right to oppose
conscription, Schenck and a fellow defendant were found guilty of conspiring to cause insubordination and to obstruct recruiting, in violation
of the Espionage Act of 1917. In an opinion whose reasoning occupied
less than two pages, Justice Holmes concluded for a unanimous Court
168
that the convictions did not offend the first amendment.
Contrary to popular rumor, Schenck was not the first freedom of
expression case decided by the Supreme Court. Ex parte Jackson1 69 and
In re Rapier17 0 had held that Congress could exclude lottery materials
from the mails. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams 17 1 had allowed
Congress to keep an alien anarchist from entering the country. Patterson
v. Colorado,172 assuming without deciding that first amendment principles applied to the states, had upheld a contempt citation for publications
interfering with judicial proceedings. "Gompersv. Bucks Stove & Range
Co. 173 had permitted punishment of a labor leader for exhorting his comrades to a boycott. MutualFilm Corp. v. IndustrialCommission, 174 interpreting a state constitution, had upheld movie censorship on the
unimaginative ground that motion pictures were not speech. Fox v.
Washington 17 - had upheld a conviction for publishing an article announcing a boycott of those who reported public nudity. Decisions upholding additional measures without even adverting to freedom of
expression might also be thought to have cast light upon what the
76
amendment was understood to mean.
168. 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919).
169. 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1878) (Field, J.).
170. 143 U.S. 110, 135 (1892) (Fuller, C.J.).
171. 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904) (Fuller, C.J.).
172. 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
173. 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (Lamar, J.).
174. 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915) (McKenna, J.).
175. 236 U.S. 273, 277-78 (1915) (Holmes, J.).
176. See D. CURRIE, supranote 16, at 442-44; Fuller II, supra note 16, at 870-72; see also Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 410-11 (1918) (White, C.J.) (applying Patterson's
conclusion to federal contempt citation); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918) (upholding
conviction for conspiracy to obstruct the draft without discussing first amendment questions); Weber
v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1915) (upholding ban on importation of prizefight films without discussing
first amendment questions); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 314-15 (1913) (White,
C.J.) (allowing Congress to condition second class mail privileges on the disclosure of the identity of
owners of periodicals and the identification within the periodical of materials that are advertisements); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (upholding standardless permit requirement to
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The precedents had two interesting features in common: none had

upheld a freedom of expression claim, and all had dealt rather cavalierly
with the question. Thus, it was poetic justice that Holmes dealt cava-

lierly with them. He cited Pattersononly to cast doubt on one of its more
general conclusions, Gompers only to show that one could prohibit
"words that may have all the effect of force," 177 and the other precedents

not at all. He seemed to place most reliance on a decision upholding an
earlier conviction for conspiracy to obstruct the draft, in which, as he

admitted, the first amendment issue had not been discussed. 78
It was not as if the precedents had held little value for the case at
hand. At the very least they had established, as the citation of Gompers

showed, that the first amendment did not preclude every federal law limiting speech. But they arguably stood for a great deal more. In uphold-

ing the exclusion of anarchist aliens, Turner had stressed the dangerous
"tendency" of anarchist views and added that governments "cannot be
denied the power of self-preservation."' 179 Patterson had affirmed the
power to punish even true statements "tending toward" interference with

judicial proceedings.1

0

Fox had allowed punishment of an author who

urged a boycott on the ground that there was no right to encourage violation of state laws. 18 1 Technically, all of the precedents could have been

distinguished.18 2 Nevertheless, they strongly suggested that speech could
speak in public park without discussing freedom of expression after Holmes, on the court below, 162
Mass. 510, 511 (1895), had said there was no constitutional right to speak on public property),
discussed in FullerII, supra note 16, at 870 n.25; Exparte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 375 (1882) (upholding ban on political contributions between federal employees over dissent based on freedom of expression), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 443-44. For fuller treatment of the pre-Schenck
precedents, see Rabban, The FirstAmendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
CompareMutual Film, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915) (motion pictures not speech), with Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 11 U.S. 53, 56-58 (1884) (photograph is a "Writing[]" under copyright
clause), and Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1878) (telegraphic
communication is within commerce clause). See D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 429-30.
177. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
178. Id. (discussing Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918)).
179. Turner, 194 U.S. at 294.
180. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462-63.
181. Fox, 236 U.S. at 277-78.
182. In several ofthe prior cases, as noted, the speech issue had not been raised. Others rested in
part on the ground that the complaining party was claiming a privilege that the government was not
obligated to afford to anybody. Jackson, 96 U.S. at 732; Rapier, 143 U.S. at 133; Turner, 194 U.S. at
289-90; see also id. at 292 (suggesting that first amendment did not apply to an alien outside the
country). Two cases indicated that the words in question did not qualify as speech at all. Gompers,
221 U.S. at 439; Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 244. Fox and Patterson, two of the cases most nearly
factually on point, had involved state rather than federal action, see Fox, 236 U.S. at 275; Patterson,
205 U.S. at 459, and the Court had not yet held that the fourteenth amendment made the first
amendment applicable to the states. Toledo Newspaper Co., which had reaffirmed Patterson in the
federal context, had involved judicial interference with expression, Toledo Newspaper Co., 247 U.S.
at 410-I1; the amendment on its face limits only Congress.
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be prohibited if it tended to cause harm or encouraged violations of the
law. And that, as Holmes interpreted the facts, was what Schenck and
183
his codefendant had done.

Nor did Holmes make use of readily available historical sources that
would have helped to sustain the convictions. In Patterson, with some
force, he had invoked Blackstone's assertion that the freedom of the press
was nothing more than freedom from "previous restraints" such as censorship. 184 The technique of looking to tradition to define constitutional
terms was almost as old as the document itself,185 and there was plenty of
other evidence to support Blackstone's view.18 6 Yet not only did Holmes
in Schenck decline to repeat his earlier argument; he went out of his way
to repudiate it, without giving any of the available reasons: "It well may
be that the prohibition . . . is not confined to previous restraints,
although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated
187
in Patterson v. Colorado."'
183. "Of course the document would not have been sent unless it had been intended to have
some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to the
draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out." Schenck 249 U.S. at 51.
184. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (emphasis in original); see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151 (4th ed. 1770).
185. See, eg., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798) (relying on a less conclusive passage from Blackstone as one source for narrow reading of ex post facto clause), discussed in D.
CURRIE, supra note 16, at 41-48; Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 180-81 (1796) (Justice
Paterson powerfully, if selectively, invoking Adam Smith's understanding of the term "direct tax"),
discussedin D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 31-37.
186. See generally L. LEVY,FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY:
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960) (finding evidence to this effect overwhelming, and citing, inter alia,
Milton, Locke, James Wilson's statements in the federal convention, and later views of Story and of
many state judges). It is not clear whether state constitutions explicitly providing that the abuse of
speech was punishable are evidence of something implicit in the principle itself or of an intention to
qualify it. Cf D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 127-59, 439-42 (discussing analogous histories of contract and free exercise clauses).
187. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51-52. Apart from the question whether the prior restraint doctrine
developed in the press context applied to the newly minted freedom of speech as well, see T. CooLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION *421-22-and whether the circular in Schenck
involved freedom of speech or of the press-there was a powerful argument to be made for repudiating the Pattersonconclusion: it was difficult to see why anyone desiring to protect freedom of expression would have wanted to allow subsequent punishment of all speech that displeased the
government, even though the prohibition of prior restraints did mean the interposition of a jury.
Gallatin had made this argument in the Sedition Act debates, 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2159-60 (1798),
and it had been picked up in the major treatises of Thomas Cooley and Ernst Freund. E.g., T.
COOLEY, supra, at *421 ("[TIhe liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion
if, while every man was at liberty to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might
nevertheless punish him for harmless publications."); E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER §§ 474-475
(1904). As Professor Chafee observed in embracing the Gallatin position, by 1919 numerous state
decisions had also gone beyond protecting against previous restraints. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES 11 & n.15 (1941). For a more extensive review of the early state cases, see
Anderson, The Formative Periodof FirstAmendment Theory, 1870-1915, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 56
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Holmes relied principally on the time-honored argument of absurdity so intimately associated with Marshall: "The most stringent protection of free speech," he wrote in one of the most familiar passages in the
reports, "would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic." 1 88 Those who wrote the amendment, he seemed to be
saying, were too reasonable to have disabled society from protecting itself
against speech that all would agree ought to be prohibited.1 89
This argument is less persuasive than it may seem at first glance. As
we know from Marshall's unimpeachable decision in Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore,190 nothing in the Bill of Rights was meant to limit the power
of state governments to outlaw speech harmful to the public welfare.1 9 1
It is not so difficult to believe that the framers of the amendment meant
to keep Congress entirely out of the field. In fact, the history of the
amendment lends considerable support to that conclusion. The standard
argument of the defenders of the Constitution had been that a bill of
rights was unnecessary because the document itself gave the central government no authority to regulate such matters as expression; and the first
amendment, as the ninth confirms, gave Congress no additional powers.192 Disdaining available replies to this line of reasoning, 193 Holmes
(1980). For early explanations of the reasons free expression was desirable see, e.g., the references to
Locke, Milton, and Cato in L. LEVY, supra note 186, at 88-125, invoking the search for truth, the
improvement of government, the preservation of domestic peace, and the promotion of individual
autonomy.
188. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
189. Holmes repeated this argument with an even better example in Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919), discussed infra text accompanying notes 202-07: "We venture to believe that
neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever supposed that to
make criminal the counselling of a murder within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech." Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (judicial review is implicit, because otherwise the limitations
on Congress could be evaded at pleasure-a result so absurd that it could not have been intended),
discussedin D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 66-74; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)
(Marshall, C.J.) (United States Supreme Court may review the judgments of state courts; contrary
decision would leave limits on states unenforceable), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 96102.
190. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 189-93.
191. See Barron, 33 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247-49 (fifth amendment prohibition of taking without compensation is inapplicable to states).
192. See, eg., 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 84, at 617, 618 (Mr. Sherman, opposing a motion
proposed by Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Gerry to provide "that the liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed," stated: "It is unnecessary-the power of Congress does not extend to the Press
.
...
); THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton). For the development of this argument, see
Mayton, SeditiousLibel and the Lost Guaranteeof a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91,
119-21 (1984). Justice Story, who thought that state free speech guarantees forbade only prior restraints, see supra note 186, left open the possibility that the federal government was excluded from
the field entirely. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 1874-1886 (1833). On the ninth amendment, see D. CURRIE, supra note 16, 41-49 (discussing
Calder v. Bull).
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stated his argument so sketchily as to invite easy rebuttal.
From the premise that complete protection of speech would be absurd, Holmes jumped without explanation to the famous conclusion that
the constitutional test was "whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent."1 9 4 This was by no means the only permissible conclusion. Lower courts, for example, had recently enunciated two quite
different standards for determining the punishability of statements under
the Espionage Act, one requiring only that the words have a natural and
probable tendency to bring about the substantive evil, the other requiring
a more or less explicit incitement.195 Holmes neither explained how his
test differed from these nor revealed why it was more appropriate. As
Justice Curtis had done in the Cooley case, 19 6 Holmes laid down his test
197
as a matter of mere flat.
Furthermore, the test was so cryptic as to invite a variety of interpretations. Perhaps in requiring that the danger be "clear and present"
Holmes meant that that evil be likely to occur in the near future, but that
was not the only possible reading. 98 Worse, again following the Cooley
193. For example, no state had power to make laws for the District of Columbia; it would be odd
to expect states to protect the exercise of federal powers by the military or the federal courts from
interference; the copyright clause clearly authorized limitation of speaking and publishing; and the
language used in the amendment paralleled that employed by states in which libel laws continued to
be enforced. The passage of the Sedition Act in 1798, on the other hand, was so controversial that it
arguably should not be taken, like many other actions of early Congresses, see Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816), discussedin D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 91-96, as evidence
of contemporaneous understanding of the amendment's meaning. But see McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819) (controversial nature of enactment of national bank strengthened
its value as precedent by showing that the question had not passed unnoticed), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 60-68. It is noteworthy in any event that Holmes did not refer to the debates
on the Sedition Act, in which interesting arguments had been made. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 20932171 (1798).
194. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
195. Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 889 (9th Cir. 1919) (intention to cause "natural and
probable consequences" presumed), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 552 (1919); Masses Publishing Co. v.
Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.) (L. Hand, J.) (incitement), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917) (natural and
reasonable effect plus intent). Apparently it did not occur to Holmes to interpret the statute itself
narrowly, as Hand had done, in order to avoid the constitutional question.
196. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 316 (1852), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 230-34.
197. See Corwin, ConstitutionalLaw in 1919-1920, 14 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 635, 657 (1920)
(Holmes's clear-and-present-danger test was "apparently made up out of whole cloth").
198. Professor Chafee said Holmes's test, although lacking the "administrative advantage" of
requiring that the utterance "satisfy an objective standard," lent "much support to the views of
Judge Learned Hand [inlaying down the incitement standard] in the Masses case." Z. CHAFEE,
supra note 187, at 82. Professors Gunther and Rabban, the former with the benefit of correspondence between Hand and Holmes, equate the Schenck standard with the natural-and-probable-tendency test used by other lower courts. Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
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example, he made no attempt to show how his test applied to the facts of

the case. Had he explained that the power to raise and support armies
authorized Congress to protect against the immediate impairment of na-

tional defense threatened by Schenck's scarcely veiled invitation to evade
the draft, he would have helped both to elucidate his test and to justify
his conclusion. 199
Most sobering of all, perhaps, were the implications of the clearand-present-danger test for future cases in light of the policies underlying

the first amendment. It was reasonable enough to conclude that the authors of that provision had not meant to leave the federal government
defenseless against outright incitement to the commission of federal

crimes. Unlike Learned Hand's almost contemporaneous formulation, 2 o
however, Holmes's standard required nothing resembling express incite-

ment; it apparently would suffice that the speaker had made the crime
sufficiently probable, and that could be said of many who merely criti-

cized the war.201 It was difficult to reconcile such a conclusion with any
conceivable reason for protecting free expression. On the other hand, as
the Second Circuit had intimated in overruling Hand's incitement test, to
require express incitement would deny the state any real protection; any
2°2
clever inciter could escape punishment by avoiding the magic words.
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragmentsof History, 27 STAN. L. RIV.719, 720-21 (1975); Rabban,
supra note 176, at 589-91; see also Rabban, The Emergence ofModern FirstAmendment Doctrine, 50
U. CH. L. Rav. 1205, 1207-08 (1983) (concluding that Holmes's treatment of free speech claims in
Schenck and its companion cases essentially extended pre-war tradition of "judicial hostility" and
neglect). The latter inference is strengthened by the interesting fact that Holmes affirmed the conviction rather than remanding the case for a new trial in which the lower court would apply what
appears to have been a brand new test.
199. See Z. CHAEEE, supra note 187, at 81 (adding that Schenck "was one of the few reported
prosecutions under the Act where there clearly was incitement to resist the draft").
200. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.

1917).
201. See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1920) (McKenna, J.); Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 466, 478-81 (1920) (McKenna, J., over dissents by Brandeis and Holmes, JJ.,
and by
Clarke, J.); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 245-49 (1920) (Pitney, J.,
over dissents by Brandeis
and Holmes, JJ.)
(affirming convictions for essentially mere criticism). For similar decisions in the
lower federal courts, see Z. CHAFEE, supra note 187, at 51-60. Justice Brandeis's lone dissent in
Gilbert, while based on state interference with federal functions, is noteworthy for the first appearance of his argument that freedom of expression was within the "liberty" protected from state infringement by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause: "I cannot believe that the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property."
Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
202. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917) ("[T]he Beatitudes have for
some centuries been considered highly hortatory, though they do not contain the injunction, 'Go
thou and do likewise.' "); see also Hall, FreeSpeech in War Time, 21 COLUM. L. REV.526, 531-32
(1921) (spelling out consequences of an incitement test); Z. CHAFEE, supra note 187, at 49-50 (Judge
Hand "regarded Mark Antony's funeral oration ...as having counseled violence while it expressly
discountenanced it").
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Holmes gave no indication that he was aware of this tension.
In short, while Schenck gave us the enduring test of clear and present danger, the opinion was a disappointment in virtually every respect.
Holmes paid little attention to the text of the first amendment, to the
history of its adoption, to the established common law meaning of its
terms, or to the rich collection of judicial precedents. He did not explain
how the test he articulated followed from his premises, what it meant,
how it applied to the case, or how it could be squared with the purposes
of the amendment.
2. Later cases. Two other Holmes decisions, both rendered a
week after Schenck, suggest how far the Court was prepared to go in
permitting the suppression of speech that threatened to endanger the war
effort. They also increased the already considerable doctrinal
uncertainty.
In Frohwerk v. United States,20 3 in which a war critic had suggested
that no one would blame draft resisters, the Court affirmed a conviction
without mentioning the clear-and-present-danger test, admitting that the
case was closer than Schenck because there had been no "special effort to
reach men who were subject to the draft," but nonetheless finding it reasonable to conclude "that the circulation of the paper was in quarters
where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact
was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper out.''2°4 For the
first time, Justice Holmes displayed an awareness that one must be careful not to extend this reasoning too far: "We do not lose our right to
condemn either measures or men because the Country is at war. '20 5 Indeed, he restated the holding of Schenck in terms that resemble Hand's
incitement test more than that of clear and present danger: "[W]e have
decided in Schenck. . .that a person may be convicted of a conspiracy
to obstruct recruiting by words of persuasion. ' 20 6 This was a fair characterization of the facts of both Schenck and Frohwerk if one was prepared
20 7
not to require express words of incitement.
The companion case was Debs v. United States,20 8 which affirmed
the conviction of the well-known labor politician for a speech criticizing
the war and praising individuals who had been convicted of obstructing
the draft. Once again, although Schenck was cited as dispositive, clear
203. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
204. Id. at 208-09.
205. Id. at 208.
206. Id. at 206.
207. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51. Professor Chafee blamed the Frohwerk decision on the failure
of counsel adequately to present the facts. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 187, at 82-83.
208. 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
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and present danger was not mentioned. As in Frohwerk, moreover, it
might have been difficult to show that the danger was either clear or
present. At one point, as in Frohwerk Holmes virtually parroted Hand's
incitment test: "[I]f a part or the manifest intent of the more general
utterances was to encourage those present to obstruct the recruiting service and if in passages such encouragement was directly given, the immunity of the general theme may not be enough to protect the speech." 20 9
Further on, however, he seemed to approve yet a third standard in noting
with approval that the jury had been instructed that they could not convict unless "the words used had as their natural tendency and reasonably
probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service, and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do S0. '' 210 It was thus evident that Holmes
did not set much store by the particular formulation; he seemed to think
that there was no significant difference between natural and probable tendency, clear and present danger, and encouragement and persuasion.
But he was willing to give juries considerable latitude to infer both the
speaker's intention and the likelihood of bringing about a result that had
21
not been expressly urged. '
The next term, however, when the Court affirmed yet another Espionage Act conviction in Abrams v. United States,212 Holmes and Brandeis dissented. 21 3 The specific ground of their disagreement was narrow:
charged under a statute requiring an intent to interfere with the war
against Germany, the defendants had tried only to impede efforts to suppress the Russian Revolution. 21 4 What was significant was that Holmes
went on both to make intention a part of his constitutional test and to
redefine what consituted a sufficient danger.
On the facts, Holmes argued, "nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more,
would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the
success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do
so."'215 At the same time that he wrote this, Holmes firmly proclaimed
209. Debs, 249 U.S. at 212-13.
210. Id at 216. Compare the cases cited supra note 195.
211. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 187, at 84 (arguing that "Debs's utterances are hard to reconcile
with the Supreme Court test of 'clear and present danger' ").
212. 250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919).

213. Id. at 624-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see generally Z. CHAFEE, supra note 187, at 108-40
(discussing Abrams).
214. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628: "An intent to prevent interference with the revolution in
Russia might have been satisfied without any hindrance to carrying on the war in which we were
engaged."
215. Id.; see also id. at 629 (characterizing the defendants or their pamphlets, or both, as "poor
and puny anonymities").
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his continued adherence to Schenck Frohwerk and Debs, 216 although the
publications in the first two cases were equally easy to characterize as
"silly leaflet[s] by. .. unknown [men]" and unlikely to impede the war.
Reconciliation is not impossible: Debs was more dangerous because he
was famous and influential; Schenck, because he had sent his message
directly to draftees; and all three, because they had come closer than
Abrams to expressly encouraging obstruction of the war. "Publishing
[Abrams's] opinions for the very purpose of obstructing," as Holmes ar'217
gued, "might indicate a greater danger.
Unwilling to rest solely on the greater danger of deliberate incitement, however, Holmes reformulated his test to suggest that, if the requisite intent were present, no actual danger had to be shown: "I do not
doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent

danger ....

"218

He thus seemed to be saying that the clear-and-pres-

ent-danger standard had given too much protection to speech of the kind
he thought had been at issue in Schenck.
One hint as to why he thought so may be found in his observation
that intentional encouragement "would have the quality of an attempt. ' 2 19 The suggestion seems to be that the amendment did not disturb the common law of attempted crime. Three pages later, however,
on the basis of reactions to the 1798 Sedition Act, he flatly rejected the
argument "that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force. ' 220 If attempts could still be punished, it was not
because the common law as such was undisturbed.
Greater light on Holmes's distinction may be cast by an example he
offered to illustrate the importance of an intention to bring about the
substantive evil: "A patriot might think that we were wasting money on
aeroplanes. . . and might advocate curtailment with success, yet even if
it turned out that the curtailment hindered and was thought by other
minds to have been obviously likely to hinder the United States in the
216. Id. at 627.
217. Id. at 628.
218. Id. at 627 (emphasis added). This passage helps to resolve the question "whether Holmes
meant that specific intent to hinder the war effort and a high risk of injurious consequences were
alternative bases of criminal liability, or rather that both elements had to be shown." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 611 n.16 (1978); see also id. at 610 (appearing to favor the latter

interpretation).
219. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628.
220. Id. at 630. For a contemporaneous rejection of this conclusion and a defense of the majority decision in Abrams, see Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press under the First Amendment: A
Resum , 30 YALE L.J. 48, 53-55 (1920).
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prosecution of the war, no one would hold such conduct a crime."' 22 1 To
punish all speech that endangered the war effort, he seemed at last to be
saying, would cut deeply into the values the first amendment was
designed to protect.
Holmes then attempted to identify these values for the first time:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe... that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 222
the market
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
S. ..
Holmes cited none of the available evidence to support this important
conclusion, but he was nonetheless on firm ground. 223 He proceeded to
deduce from this purpose a new version of the test applicable to "expressions of opinion and exhortations":
While [the first amendment] is part of our system I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless
they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required
to save the country. . . . Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, 224
"Congress
shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech."
In other words, although the Schenck formulation had been too protective of incitement, it had not been protective enough of opinions, which
were too valuable to be suppressed except on rare occasions of overwhelming need. In addition to placing new emphasis on the time element by rephrasing a "present" danger as an "immediate" or
"imminent" one, Holmes added what appears to have been an entirely
new requirement of gravity: apart from intentional encouragement constituting an attempted crime, speech may be punished only where neces225
sary "to save the country."
221. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627.
222. Id. at 630.
223. See supra note 187.
224. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31. Holmes's choice of words in the last sentence quoted was
unfortunate. Adherence to the judge's oath would forbid making any exceptions to the constitutional command, but Holmes himself had demonstrated in his earlier opinions that "the freedom of
speech" was a term of art that reasonable people could not have meant to equate with freedom to say

whatever one pleased. Even in Abrams, Holmes did not explicitly refute Blackstone's position that
freedom of expression meant only freedom from previous restraints, but that position was clearly
inconsistent with his stated views as to the purpose of the amendment.
225. See also Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (insisting that the danger or intended danger be that the
evil occur "forthwith"). Immediacy thus seems to have been part of his test of an "attempt" as well.
Near the end of his opinion Holmes added, without explanation, the novel and interesting notion
that the first amendment also limited the punishment that could be imposed even for speech not
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Was Holmes taking advantage of the freedom of a dissenter to develop an idea he had been able only to hint at without losing his majority
in Schenck or had he experienced a conversion not less remarkable than
that of Saul of Tarsus? 2 26 In either event, although he still answered
neither Blackstone nor Hand, he vigorously proclaimed the aspirations of
the expression clauses and began the long battle to rescue them from the
2 27
obscurity to which his earlier opinions had helped to consign them.

wholly protected: "Even if I am technically wrong and enough can be squeezed from these poor and
puny anonymities to turn the color of legal litmus paper; . . . even if what I think the necessary
intent were shown; the most nominal punishment seems to me all that possibly could be inflicted
. . ." Id. at 629. See Van Alstyne, FirstAmendment Limitationson Recovery from the Press-An
Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solution," 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 793, 802 (1984). For an
additional indication of the development of more liberal notions of freedom of expression during the
White period, see United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 430-31 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the prevailing notion that use
of the mails was a privilege whose regulation was not subject to the restraints applicable to criminal
laws: "Congress may not through its postal police power put limitations upon the freedom of the
press which if directly attempted would be unconstitutional."). Cf Z. CHAFEE, supra note 187, at 99
("[E]xclusion from the mails practically destroys the circulation of a book or periodical.
...).
226. See F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 52 (1938)

(Schenck had "laid down cautionary limits against inroads upon freedom of speech not actually
embarrassing the nation's safety"); P. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 172 (1960)
(Schenck "had committed the Court to an essentially libertarian formula for determining when
speech may be abridged"); Gunther, supra note 198, at 741-45 (taking a more skeptical view after
reviewing Holmes's correspondence and noting, among other things, the initial appearance of
Zechariah Chafee's powerful commentary, Z. CHAFEE, supra note 187, between Schenck and
Abrams). For evidence that Holmes's noble sentiments in Abrams did not meet with universal approbation, see Wigmore, Abrams v. United States: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in
War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REv. 539, 545, 552 (1920) (calling dissent "shocking in its
obtuse indifference to the vital issue at stake in August, 1918," and suggesting that "all principles of
normal internal order may be suspended" during war).
227. Other Bill of Rights decisions of the period include Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245,
252-53 (1910) (Holmes, J.) (curtly allowing defendant to be required to model a shirt because fifth
amendment's self-incrimination provision "is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence"); Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (Hughes, J.) (relying on property concepts to uphold an order
requiring corporate officer to produce corporation's papers that would incriminate him, over a good
dissent by McKenna); National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 71 (1914) (Lamar, J.) (holding fourth amendment's unreasonable-search principle inapplicable to states); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-98 (1914) (Day, J., for a unanimous Court) (distinguishing, on grounds of
judicial administration, decisions refusing to investigate source of evidence when offered at trialincluding the same Justice's decision, again for a unanimous Court, in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S.
585 (1904)-in holding that Constitution required return of property unlawfully seized upon timely
application: "If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right
to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution."); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (holding that to allow government after returning
property unlawfully seized to reclaim it by subpoena on basis of knowledge gained in the unlawful
seizure would "reduce[] the Fourth Amendment to a form of words"); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298, 305-13 (1921) (Clarke, J.) (holding entry by imposture to be unreasonable search, reaffirm-
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CONCLUSION

It is not easy, without prolixity, to give a comprehensive picture of a
period in which over six hundred constitutional cases were decided. It
helps that, in those days before the modem expansion of certiorari
juridiction, the great bulk of the cases required only the application of

settled principles. It remains true that even these cases add to our understanding of the Court's approach to constitutional decisionmaking and of
the judicial personalities of its members. Moreover, as the voluminous
footnotes designed to flesh out the bare bones of the main story indicate,
there are quite a number of significant constitutional decisions that can-

not be discussed at length without running the risk of losing sight of the
larger picture. One can only hope that the highly restrictive and idiosyn-

cratic process of selection has produced a series of snapshots that not
only explore those aspects of the White years that one observer finds

most interesting but also indicate something about the period as a whole.
In numerical terms, by far the greater part of the Court's constitutional docket consisted, as in the preceding period, of attacks on state

action under four provisions: the due process, equal protection, contract,
and commerce clauses. Encouraged by the Court's position that the

fourteenth amendment made it the ultimate judge of the reasonableness
of official action, litigants seemed willing to ask the Court to overturn
just about anything a state might try to do-and state governments were

very active during the period. Except in the commerce clause cases,
ing conclusions of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note
16, at 444-47, that warrant may not issue for mere evidence and that introduction of illegally seized
papers offends self-incrimination ban, and extending Weeks to require exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence because "a rule of practice must not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail
over a constitutional right"); and Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (Day, J.) (following logic of Weeks in refusing to require government to return property taken by private individuals
because fourth and fifth amendments not violated by private action). See also Minneapolis & St. L.
R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (White, C.J.) (holding seventh amendment requirement
of civil jury inapplicable to state court enforcing federal law); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228
U.S. 364, 380 (1913) (Van Devanter, J.) (exhaustively reviewing the precedents in concluding, over
an equally detailed Hughes dissent for four Justices, id. at 400-28, that judgment n.o.v. offended
seventh amendment provision that "no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law," see U.S. CONST. amend.
VII).
Holt is defended, and Gouled criticized, in 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2264 n.4, § 2265 & n.7 (. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961), on the appealing ground that only
compulsory testimony implicates the fundamental policies underlying the self-incrimination provision since only in that situation are "the oath and private thoughts and beliefs of the individual...
involved." Id. § 2263. For a serious defense of Slocum on historical grounds, see generally Schofield, New Trials and the Seventh Amendment-Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 8 ILL. L. REV.
287, 381, 465 (1913-14). But see 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 312-14 (arguing, in
view of similarity between judgment n.o.v. and accepted directed-verdict practice, that Slocum typified "fundamental conservatism" of White Court).
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however, the challengers were usually disappointed. The Court went
through enormous efforts, with very little direct impact on the world
around it, and in none of these areas did the White period produce important doctrinal develoments.
Far more interesting were developments in two other areas in which
the numbers of cases were far smaller: the extent of enumerated congressional powers, and the restraints of the first amendment. The first category presented the Court with the continuing challenge of measuring the
deeds of an increasingly active Congress against a Constitution framed
under strikingly different conditions. The second demonstrated the
stress placed upon first amendment values by a wartime emergency.
These pressures posed the critical intellectual challenges to the Court
during the White period.
I do not think it can be said that the Court responded heroically to
these demands. Its decisions on the scope of enumerated powers reveal
an awareness of the tension between the necessary and proper clause and
the principle of limited powers, but seem wholly capricious in attempting
to resolve it. The cases on freedom of expression seem to reflect an extreme insensitivity to the values underlying the amendment, in the face of
an eloquent, if belated, appeal by Holmes and Brandeis.
Like the Waite period, 228 this era was characterized by short opinions. No doubt in both periods this was attributable in part to docket
pressures; the Court had a great many cases to decide. In the early years
of the White Court, moreover, there was a high degree of unanimityperhaps in part because there were not many important new issues of
principle.2 29 Dissents, like important new issues, became much more frequent after 1916-and after Wilson's appointments of McReynolds,
Brandeis, and Clarke. Concurring opinions were rare throughout the period. Inconsistency and inadequate explanation, as usual, were not.
Individual Justices, on the other hand, were often highly predictable. Lurton, during his brief stay, tended toward narrow construction
of federal powers and of civil rights. 230 White, Van Devanter, and Mc228. For a discussion of the Waite Court (1874-1888), see D. CURRIE, supra note 16, at 361-452.
229. See also M. PusEY, supra note 4, at 282, 293 (describing early White years as era of good
feeling within Court despite Chief Justice's lack of leadership qualities, and noting Hughes's belief
that dissent should rarely be expressed); M. KLINKHAMER, supranote 17, at 61 ("When White was
first made Chief Justice, he was reported to have said that he was 'going to stop this dissenting
business,' and it was further alleged that he had stopped it except for Mr. Justice Harlan.").
230. His two most important opinions for the Court were Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565
(1911) (Congress could not forbid a new state to move its capital), and Jones v. Jones, 234 U.S. 615,
618-19 (1914) (equal protection did not require state to allow former slaves to inherit property). He
dissented from the invalidation of peonage in Bailey v. Alabama and the upholding of congressional
power in Shreveport. See supra notes 46-52, 110-15 and accompanying text; see also 9 A. BICKEL &
B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 74-80, 335-40 (noting that Lurton had not been operating at peak
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Reynolds often dissented from decisions upholding federal authority or
rejecting due process claims. 231 Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes, and Clarke
were more likely than their colleagues to uphold both state and federal
authority, 232 except that the first two developed a heightened sensitivity
to first amendment claims after Hughes's departure, 2 33 and that Clarke
displayed a marked antipathy to measures of all kinds that interfered
with the market for alcoholic beverages. 234 McKenna was somewhat
more inclined than the majority to invoke substantive due process but
took a rather broad view of congressional powers. 235 Pitney, whose ideas
of federal authority were narrower, joined Holmes, Brandeis, and Clarke
236
in opposition to the aggressive doctrine of admiralty preemption.
Day, who seldom dissented in constitutional cases, was most representa237
tive of the position of the White Court in this field.
Like his immediate predecessor, Chief Justice White played a rela-

tively modest role in speaking for the Court, and, though he dissented
energy during his brief tenure, and concluding that "his main career had been as a federal circuit
judge").
231. All three dissented, for example, from Doremus, Mountain Timber, Bunting, the Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases, and Block. See supra notes 66-71, 102 and accompanying text. The
Chief Justice, however, also dissented from the denial of congressional power over primary elections
in Newberry, and argued in Gilbert that federal authority to prevent interference with the war effort
was exclusive. See supra notes 88, 201. Van Devanter had begun by writing two opinions broadly
construing the power to regulate matters affecting interstate commerce; in later years he proved
hostile to the use of federal powers for police purposes, though he had gone along with the Court's
opinion in the white-slave case. See supra text accompanying notes 39-88.
232. Holmes and Hughes dissented from the invalidation of the yellow dog law; Holmes, Brandeis, and Clarke dissented from the invalidation of the employment agency and child labor laws and
of the tax on stock dividends. See supra notes 57-64, 71, 89-96 and accompanying text. Brandeis
and Clarke, but not Holmes, dissented from invalidation of the federal primary election law in Newberry as well. See supra note 88; see also M. PusEy, supra note 17, at 289 (describing Holmes and
Hughes as the "two leading liberals" of the early White years).
233. See supranote 201 and text accompanying notes 212-27 (discussing Abrams, Pierce,Schaefer, and Gilbert). Brandeis dissented in all of these cases; Holmes, in all but Gilbert. Clarke joined
them only in Schaefer and wrote for the Court to uphold the conviction in Abrams. See supra note
212.
234. See National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 407-11 (1920) (Clarke, J., dissenting from
broad construction of the eighteenth amendment); Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 310 (1920)
(Clarke, J., dissenting from decision upholding congressional power to ban nonintoxicating beer);
United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 428 (1919) (Clarke, J., joining in dissent of McReynolds, J., from
decision upholding statute forbidding bringing liquor into state whose law forbade sale).
235. McKenna dissented in Hammer, Block the Arizona Employers'LiabilityCases, and Mountain Timber. See supra note 96 and text accompanying notes 57-64.
236. Pitney dissented from the upholding of federal authority in Shreveport and Holland, but
also from the denial of federal power in Newberry. See supra notes 46-52, 80-88 and accompanying
text. For his dissenting votes in the admiralty cases of Jensen, Chelentis, and Knickerbocker, see
supra notes 141-67 and accompanying text.
237. Day did dissent both from Coppage v. Kansas and from Eisner v. Macomber. See supra
notes 71, 94; see also . MCLEAN, supra note 17, at 65, 116 (describing Day as strict in his construction of federal authority but tolerant of state police-power measures).
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often, almost never wrote a dissenting opinion. Following longstanding
tradition, he did use the prestige of his office to good advantage in reserving to himself several of the most politcally sensitive controversies: the
grandfather clause, the income tax, the military draft, and wartime measures that interfered with private interests in order to assure essential services. 238 His opinion style was generally impenetrable, and there was little
evidence during this period of the originality that had characterized his
earlier opinions on insular possessions and full faith and credit. 239 Yet he
marshalled history effectively in the draft case, and his emphatic application of the fifteenth amendment against the grandfather clause was an
impressive achievement.
McKenna, the senior Associate Justice, was again given little of importance to write, and justified the low expectations of two Chief Justices
by having little of interest to say. Most of his opinions that are not completely forgotten applied settled law without flair, 24° and his most significant departure-in upholding overtime legislation in Bunting 241-failed
both to distinguish the precedents and to explain the reasonableness of
the law. 242 Day, on the other hand, seemed to get more than his share of
important opinions to write, including Muskrat,Hammer, Doremus, and
Buchanan-although, as his opinions in those cases suggest, he was not
243
among the more impressive craftsmen on the bench.
238. See supra notes 49, 71, 79, 97, 115-17 (discussing Guinn, Brushaber,Selective Draft Law
Cases, Wilson v. New, and Dakota Cent Tel.); see also Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 591
(1918) (upholding judicial authority to enforce judgment against state); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City
of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 283-84 (1913) (holding abuse of state authority to be state action
within the fourteenth amendment).
239. See Fuller II, supra note 16, at 873-80, 883-89, 894-97 (discussing the insular cases, Clarke
v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900), Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), and Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U.S. 562 (1906)); M. KLINKHAMER, supra note 17, at 234 ("The repetitious prolixity just noted
is perhaps the most outstanding quality of a style not intrinsically appealing.").
240. See supra notes 103, 145 and text accompanying note 53 (discussing Hadacheck, Blackwell,
and Hoke).
241. 243 U.S. 426, 438 (1917), discussed supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
242. He also authored two pedestrian opinions allowing the punishment of war critics--Gilbert
v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), and Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920)-and
originated the novel but ill-explained use of due process to strike down a delegation of power to
private property owners in Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1912). Perhaps his best
opinion was a dissent, in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 386-94 (1911) (McKenna, J., dissenting), from the Court's narrow reliance on property concepts to define self-incrimination.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 20-37, 57-71, 121-40. He deserves credit, however, for
having anchored what later became the exclusionary rule in the need to enforce the fourth amendment, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and for having balked at the Court's willingness
to apply more lenient commerce clause standards to a state segregation law than to other police
power regulations affecting the same streetcars. See supranote 145 (discussing the two South Covington cases).
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Of the five Justices appointed by Taft around the time of White's
elevation, Lurton and Lamar made little impression, while the other

three showed significant abilities. 244 Hughes was unusually prominent
for a newcomer, becoming the Court's leading spokesman on civil rights
as well as on the positive and negative aspects of the commerce clause
before he left the bench to run for President in 1916.245 Van Devanter,
who had played a rather substantial role at the outset, ended up produc-

ing very little; his few significant opinions suggested that he was a thorough and careful thinker, if a narrowly literal one. 246 Pitney, the author
of Coppage, wrote effectively to sustain a state income tax against commerce clause attack, to strike down a federal tax on stock dividends, and
to protest both the extension of maritime uniformity and the denial of
24 7
federal power over primary elections.
Wilson's three appointees were a mixed bag in terms not only of

outlook, as already indicated, but of craftsmanship as well. Except for

his vote, Clarke was not much of a factor. 248 McReynolds wrote surprisingly little beyond his firm, if one-sided, opinions striking down state
244. Lamar sat as long as Hughes but wrote fewer than half as many constitutional opinions.
His most significant efforts entailed the application of settled principles, see, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909), to strike down a provision seeking to localize a transitory cause of
action in Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 359 (1914), and the more adventurous extension of precedents, see Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649 (1892); see also 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 664-65; Foster, The Delegationof
Legislative Power to Administrative Officers, 7 ILL. L. REv. 397, 403-05 (1913), to uphold a delegation of rulemaking power to protect national forests in United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506
(1911). Justice Harlan died before having the time to contribute significantly to the work of the
White years. For a discussion of Lurton, see supra note 230 and accompanying text. For a favorable
view of all five appointments, see generally 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 3-85; for

an assessment of Lamar's achievements, see id. at 357-66.
245. See supra notes 128, 140 and text accompanying notes 109-15 (discussing Bailey v. Alabama, Truax v. Raich, andMcCabe v.Atchison, T &S.F Ry.); supra text accompanying notes 42-52
(discussing the ShreveportRate Case and Baltimore & O.R.R. v. ICC); supra note 145 (discussing the
Minnesota Rate Cases, Atlantic Coast Line, PortRichmond, and Sault Ste. Marie); 9 A. BICKEL & B.
SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 392-406 (calling him one of the few Justices ever to make a significant
mark in such a short time); M. PusEY, supra note 17, at 303, 314 (praising Hughes's work and
concluding that his "greatest contribution to judicial thinking in this period came in the adaptation
of law to the control of national economic policy").
246. See supranotes 37, 227 (discussing Dillon v. Gloss, Evans, and Slocum); supra text accompanying notes 44-45 (discussing Southern Ry. v. United States and the Second Employers' Liability
Cases; M. PusEy, supra note 17, at 284 (noting that Van Devanter added a great deal in conference
but was already showing signs of what Justice Sutherland later called "pen paralysis").
247. See supra notes 71, 88, 145 and text accompanying notes 141-67 (discussing United States
Glue, Eisner, Jensen, and Newberry); see also M. PuSEY, supra note 17, at 284 (stating that Pitney
was highly regarded by his brethren). For Coppage, see supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
248. His most important opinions were his uninspiring limitation of speech in Abrams, his illjustified allowance of private lawmaking in Cusack, and his vigorous discarding of precedent to
extend the remedies for unreasonable seizures in Gouled v. United States. See supra notes 140, 227
and text accompanying notes 212-27.
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laws affecting the admiralty. 249 Brandeis wrote even less for the Court in
constitutional matters, but displayed his strength both in his learned dissents from decisions hostile to regulation and taxes and in his impas25 0
sioned pleas for free expression.
That leaves Holmes. To posterity, and to many contemporaries, he
was the dominant figure of the day. This is partly because of his felicitous way with words and partly because his positions are appealing to the
late twentieth-century mind.2 51 Though he was a workhorse who wrote
more majority opinions in constitutional matters than any of his colleagues, what he wrote for the Court was not uniformly impressive. In
Missouri v. Holland he was careless as to the scope of the treaty power; in
Fox, Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs he was cavalier, superficial, and inattentive to the values of free expression.2 52 As during the Fuller years, it
was chiefly in dissent that Holmes made his mark. His name is associated with articulate protests against most of the White Court's illiberal
decisions, including Coppage, Hammer, Jensen, the tax case of Eisner v.
2 54
Macomber,2 53 and, most important of all, Abrams v. United States.
249. See supra note 155 and text accompanying notes 141-67 (discussing Jensen, Chelentis, and
Knickerbocker). He wrote effectively to sustain compulsory road work in Butler,and ineffectively to
require de novo review of administratively set rates in Ben Avon, and wrote to deny federal power
over primary elections in Newbeny. See supra notes 88, 115, 140. For a fascinating portrait of this
Justice-whom Professor Bickel described as very likely "the most difficult man ever to serve" on
the Court-see 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 341-57 (adding that, though able,
McReynolds gave little attention to the writing of opinions, "being affected by a curious notion that
opinions were essentially superfluities anyway").
250. See supra notes 71, 140, 201, 224 (discussing Ben Avon, Eisner, Pierce, Schaefer, Gilbert,
and Milwaukee Publishing Co.). His only important constitutional opinion for the Court was in
upholding wartime liquor prohibition in Hamilton. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79; see
also 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 367-68 (describing Brandeis as the first Justice
representative of a new way of thinking and the celebrated fight over his appointment as one "for the
soul of the Supreme Court": "In his opinions would be glimpsed the second half of the twentieth
century.").
251. Compare Felix Frankfurter's contemporaneous paean: "It makes all the difference in the
world whether the Constitution is treated primarily as a text for interpretation or as an instrument of
government." Frankfurter, Twenty Years ofMr. Justice Holmes' ConstitutionalOpinions, 36 HARV.
L. REV. 909, 920 (1923).
252. See supratext accompanying notes 80-87, 168-211. More admirable were several of his less
celebrated opinions, e.g., his interesting insights into the differences between legislative and judicial
procedures in Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1915), his
indignant prevention of an end run around the fourth amendment in Silverthorne v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920), and his persuasive use of precedent and other arguments to sustain rent
control in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155-58 (1921). See M. PusEy, supra note 17, at 285-86
(describing Holmes's opinions as "short and pungent but sometimes lacking in body and clarity").
253. See supra note 71 and text accompanying notes 55-64, 93-94, 141-64 (discussing Eisner,
Hammer, Coppage, and Jensen).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 212-27. See also Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347
(1915) (Holmes, J., joined by Hughes, J., dissenting) (protesting that mob domination rendered trial
a deprivation of liberty without due process); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 265-66 (1920) (Holmes,
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If he had done nothing else in these eleven years, Hoimes would still
be justly celebrated for the Abrams dissent, not least because it suggests
an astonishing capacity for growth in a man nearly eighty years old. For
nobility of aspiration this opinion ranks with the racial justice of Bailey,
Guinn, and Buchanan; for sheer eloquence and creativity it outshines
them all. It took a long time for Holmes's message to sink in. In the
long run, however, it effected a profound and lasting change in the country's perception of freedom of expression. The Abrams dissent was the
supreme achievement of an otherwise largely uninspiring period.

J., dissenting) (taking functional view of protection of judicial compensation in article I1); and the
less liberal, though challenging, dissent from the invalidation of criminal penalties for quitting work
in Bailey v. Alabama, discussed supra text accompanying notes 110-15.
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